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Abstract
We study the evolution of opinions (or beliefs) over a social network modeled as a signed graph.
The sign attached to an edge in this graph characterizes whether the corresponding individuals or end
nodes are friends (positive links) or enemies (negative links). Pairs of nodes are randomly selected to
interact over time, and when two nodes interact, each of them updates its opinion based on the opinion
of the other node and the sign of the corresponding link. This model generalizes DeGroot model to
account for negative links: when two enemies interact, their opinions go in opposite directions. We
provide conditions for convergence and divergence in expectation, in mean-square, and in almost sure
sense, and exhibit phase transition phenomena for these notions of convergence depending on the
parameters of the opinion update model and on the structure of the underlying graph. We establish
a no-survivor theorem, stating that the difference in opinions of any two nodes diverges whenever
opinions in the network diverge as a whole. We also prove a live-or-die lemma, indicating that almost
surely, the opinions either converge to an agreement or diverge. Finally, we extend our analysis to cases
where opinions have hard lower and upper limits. In these cases, we study when and how opinions
may become asymptotically clustered to the belief boundaries, and highlight the crucial influence of
(strong or weak) structural balance of the underlying network on this clustering phenomenon.
Keywords: opinion dynamics, signed graph, social networks, opinion clustering
1 Introduction
1.1 Motivation
We all form opinions about economical, political, and social events that take place in society. These
opinions can be binary (e.g., whether one supports a candidate in an election or not) or continuous (to
what degree one expects a prosperous future economy). Our opinions are revised when we interact with
each other over various social networks. Characterizing the evolution of opinions, and understanding
the dynamic and asymptotic behavior of the social belief, are fundamental challenges in the theoretical
study of social networks.
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Building a good model on how individuals interact and influence each other is essential for studying
opinion dynamics. In interaction models, it is natural that a trusted friend should have a different
influence on the opinion formation than a dubious stranger. The observation that sentiment influences
opinions can be traced back to the 1940’s when Heider (1946) introduced the theory of signed social
networks, where each interaction link in the social network is associated with a sign (positive or negative)
indicating whether two individuals are friends or enemies. Efforts to understand the properties of signed
social networks have led to the development of structural balance theory, with seminal contributions
by Cartwright and Harary (1956) and Davis (1963, 1967). A fundamental insight from these studies,
formalized in Harary’s theorem Harary (1953), is that local structural properties imply hard global
constraints on the social network formation.
In this paper, we attempt to model the evolution of opinions in signed social networks when local
hostile or antagonistic relations influence the global social belief. The relative strengths and structures
of positive and negative relations are shown to have an essential effect on opinion convergence. In some
cases, tight conditions for convergence and divergence can be established.
1.2 Related Work
The concept of signed social networks was introduced by Heider (1946). His objective was to formally
distinguish between friendly (positive) and hostile (negative) relationships. The notion of structural
balance was introduced to understand local interactions, and formalize intricate local scenarios (e.g., two
of my friends are enemies). A number of classical results on social balance was established by Harary
(1953), Cartwright and Harary (1956), Davis (1963, 1967), who derived critical conditions on the global
structure of the social network which ensure structural balance. Social balance theory has since become
an important topic in the study of social networks. On one hand, efforts are made to characterize and
compute the degree of balance for real-world large social networks, e.g. Facchetti et al. (2011). On the
other hand, dynamical models are proposed for the signs of social links with the aim of describing stable
equilibria or establishing asymptotic convergence for the sign patterns, e.g., Galam (1996) (where a
signed structure was introduced as a revised Ising model of political coalitions, where two competing
world coalitions were shown to have one unique stable formation), Macy et al. (2003) (who verified
convergence to structural balances numerically for a Hopfield model), and Marvel et al. (2011) (where a
continuous-time dynamical model for the link signs was proposed under which convergence to structural
balance was proven).
Opinion dynamics is another long-standing topic in the study of social networks, see Jackson (2008)
and Easley and Kleinberg (2010) for recent textbooks. Following the survey Acemoglu and Ozdaglar
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(2011), we classify opinion evolution models into Bayesian and non-Bayesian updating rules. Their main
difference lies in whether each node has access to and acts according to a global model or not. We
refer to Banerjee (1992), Bikhchandani et al. (1992) and, more recent work Acemoglu et al. (2011)
for Bayesian opinion dynamics. In non-Bayesian models, nodes follow simple local updating strategies.
DeGroot’s model (DeGroot (1974)) is a classical non-Bayesian model of opinion dynamics, where each
node updates its belief as a convex combination of its neighbors’ beliefs, e.g., DeMarzo et al. (2003),
Golub and Jackson (2010), Jadbabaie et al. (2012). Note that DeGroot’s model relates to averaging
consensus algorithms, e.g., Tsitsiklis (1984), Xiao and Boyd (2004), Boyd et al. (2006), Tahbaz-Salehi
and Jadbabaie (2008), Fagnani and Zampieri (2008), Touri and Nedic´ (2011), Matei et al. (2013). Non-
consensus asymptotic behaviors, e.g., clustering, disagreement, and polarization, have been investigated
for linear or nonlinear variations of DeGroot-type update rules, Krause (1997), Blondel et al. (2009,
2010), Dandekar et al. (2013), Shi et al. (2013), Li et al. (2013). Various models from statistical physics
have also been applied to study social opinion dynamics, please refer to Castellano et al. (2009) for a
survey.
The influence of misbehaving nodes in social networks have been studied only to some extent. For
instance, in Acemoglu et al. (2010), a model of the spread of misinformation in large societies was
discussed. There, some individuals are forceful, meaning that they influence the beliefs of some of the
other individuals they meet, but do not change their own opinions. In Acemoglu et al. (2013), the authors
studied the propagation of opinion disagreement under DeGroot’s model, when some nodes stick to their
initial beliefs during the entire evolution. This idea was extended to binary opinion dynamics under the
voter model in Yildiz et al. (2013). In Altafini (2012, 2013), the author proposed a linear model for belief
dynamics over signed graphs. In Altafini (2013), it was shown that a bipartite agreement, i.e., clustering
of opinions, is reached as long as the signed social graph is strongly balanced in the sense of the classical
structural balance theory (Cartwright and Harary (1956)), which presents an important link between
opinion dynamics and structure balance. However, in the model studied in Altafini (2012, 2013), all
beliefs converge to a common value, equal to zero, if the graph is not strongly balanced. This behavior
seems to be difficult to interpret and justify from real-world observations. A game-theoretical approach
for studying the interplay between good and bad players in collaborative networks was introduced in
Theodorakopoulos and Baras (2008).
1.3 Contribution
We propose and analyze a new model for belief dynamics over signed social networks. Nodes randomly
execute pairwise interactions to update their beliefs. In case of a positive link (representing that the two
3
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interacting nodes are friends), the update follows DeGroot’s update rule which drives the two beliefs
closer to each other. On the contrary, in case of a negative link (i.e., when the two nodes are enemies),
the update increases the difference between the two beliefs. Thus, two opposite types of opinion updates
are defined, and the beliefs are driven not only by random node interactions but also by the type of
relationship of the interacting nodes. Under this simple attraction–repulsion model for opinions on signed
social networks, we establish a number of fundamental results on belief convergence and divergence, and
study the impact of the parameters of the update rules and of the network structure on the belief
dynamics.
Using classical spectral methods, we derive conditions for mean and mean-square convergence and
divergence of beliefs. We establish phase transition phenomena for these notions of convergence, and
study how the thresholds depend on the parameters of the opinion update model and on the structure of
the underlying graph. We derive phase transition conditions for almost sure convergence and divergence
of beliefs. The proofs are based on what we call the Triangle lemma, which characterizes the evolution of
the beliefs held by three different nodes. We utilize probabilistic tools such as the Borel-Cantelli lemma,
the Martingale convergence theorems, the strong law of large numbers, and sample-path arguments.
We establish two counter-intuitive results about the way beliefs evolve: (i) a no-survivor theorem
which states that the difference between opinions of any two nodes tends to infinity almost surely (along
a subsequence of instants) whenever the difference between the maximum and the minimum beliefs in the
network tends to infinity (along a subsequence of instants); (ii) a live-or-die lemma which demonstrates
that almost surely, the opinions either converge to an agreement or diverge. We also show that networks
whose positive component includes an hypercube are (essentially, the only) robust networks in the sense
that almost sure convergence of beliefs holds irrespective of the number of negative links, their positions
in the network, and the strength of the negative update.
The considered model is extended to cases where updates may be asymmetric (in the sense that when
two nodes interact, only one of them updates its belief), and where beliefs have hard lower and upper
constraints. The latter boundedness constraint adds slight nonlinearity to the belief evolution. It turns
out in this case that the classical social network structural balance theory plays a fundamental role in
determining the asymptotic formation of opinions:
• If the social network is structurally balanced (strongly balanced, or complete and weakly balanced),
i.e., the network can be divided into subgroups with positive links inside each subgroup and negative
links among different subgroups, then almost surely, the beliefs within the same subgroup will be
clustered to one of the belief boundaries, when the strength of the negative updates is sufficiently
large.
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• In the absence of structural balance, and if the positive graph of the social network is connected,
then almost surely, the belief of each node oscillates between the lower and upper bounds and
touches the two belief boundaries an infinite number of times.
For balanced social networks, the boundary clustering results are established based on the almost sure
happening of suitable separation events, i.e., the node beliefs for a subgroup become group polarized
(either larger or smaller than the remaining nodes’ beliefs). From this argument such events tend to
happen more easily in the presence of small subgroups. As a result, small subgroups contribute to faster
clustering of the social beliefs, which is consistent with the study of minority influence in social psychology
Nemeth (1986), Clark and Maass (1990) suggesting that consistent minorities can substantially influence
opinions. For unbalanced social networks, the established opinion oscillation contributes to a new type of
belief formation which complements polarization, disagreement, and consensus Dandekar et al. (2013).
1.4 Paper Organization
In Section 2, we present the signed social network model, specify the dynamics along positive and negative
links, and define the problem of interest. Section 3 focuses on the mean and mean-square convergence
and divergence analysis, and Section 4 considers convergence and divergence in the almost sure sense.
In Section 5, we study a model with upper and lower belief bounds and asymmetric updates. It is shown
how structural balance determines the clustering of opinions. Finally concluding remarks are given in
Section 6.
Notation and Terminology
An undirected graph is denoted by G = (V,E). Here V = {1, . . . , n} is a finite set of vertices (nodes).
Each element in E is an unordered pair of two distinct nodes in V, called an edge. The edge between
nodes i, j ∈ V is denoted by {i, j}. Let V∗ ⊆ V be a subset of nodes. The induced graph of V∗ on G,
denoted GV∗ , is the graph (V∗,EV∗) with {u, v} ∈ EV∗ , u, v ∈ V∗ if and only if {u, v} ∈ E. A path in G
with length k is a sequence of distinct nodes, v1v2 . . . vk+1, such that {vm, vm+1} ∈ E, m = 1, . . . , k. The
length of a shortest path between two nodes i and j is called the distance between the nodes, denoted
d(i, j). The greatest length of all shortest paths is called the diameter of the graph, denoted diam(G). The
degree matrix of G, denoted D(G), is the diagonal matrix diag(d1, . . . , dn) with di denoting the number
of nodes sharing an edge with i, i ∈ V. The adjacency matrix A(G) is the symmetric n× n matrix such
that [A(G)]ij = 1 if {i, j} ∈ E and [A(G)]ij = 0 otherwise. The matrix L(G) := D(G) − A(G) is called
the Laplacian of G. Two graphs containing the same number of vertices are called isomorphic if they are
identical subject to a permutation of vertex labels.
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All vectors are column vectors and denoted by lower case letters. Matrices are denoted with upper case
letters. Given a matrix M , M ′ denotes its transpose and Mk denotes the k-th power of M when it is a
square matrix. The ij-entry of a matrix M is denoted [M ]ij . Given a matrix M ∈ Rmn, the vectorization
of M , denoted by vec(M), is the mn× 1 column vector ([M ]11, . . . , [M ]m1, . . . , [M ]1n, . . . , [M ]mn)′. We
have vec(ABC) = (C ′⊗A)vec(B) for all real matrices A,B,C with ABC well defined. A square matrix
M is called a stochastic matrix if all of its entries are non-negative and the sum of each row of M equals
one. A stochastic matrix M is doubly stochastic if M ′ is also a stochastic matrix. With the universal set
prescribed, the complement of a given set S is denoted Sc. The orthogonal complement of a subspace
S in a vector space is denoted S⊥. Depending on the argument, | · | stands for the absolute value of
a real number, the Euclidean norm of a vector, and the cardinality of a set. Similarly with argument
well defined, σ(·) represents the σ-algebra of a random variable (vector), or the spectrum of a matrix.
The smallest integer no smaller than a given real number a is denoted dae. We use P(·) to denote the
probability, E{·} the expectation, V{·} the variance of their arguments, respectively.
2 Opinion Dynamics over Signed Social Networks
In this section, we present our model of interaction between nodes in a signed social network, and describe
the resulting dynamics of the beliefs held by each node.
2.1 Signed Social Network and Peer Interactions
We consider a social network with n ≥ 3 members, each labeled by a unique integer in {1, 2, . . . , n}. The
network is represented by an undirected graph G = (V,E) whose node set V = {1, 2, . . . , n} corresponds
to the members and whose edge set E describes potential interactions between the members. Each edge in
E is assigned a unique label, either + or −. In classical social network theory, a + label indicates a friend
relation, while a − label indicates an enemy relation (Heider (1946), Cartwright and Harary (1956)).
The graph G equipped with a sign on each edge is then called a signed graph. Let Epst and Eneg be the
collection of the positive and negative edges, respectively; clearly, Epst∩Eneg = ∅ and Epst∪Eneg = E. We
call Gpst = (V,Epst) and Gneg = (V,Eneg) the positive and the negative graph, respectively; see Figure 1
for an illustration. Without loss of generality, we adopt the following assumption throughout the paper.
Assumption 1 The underlying graph G is connected, and the negative graph Gneg is nonempty.
Actual interactions follow the model introduced in Boyd et al. (2006): each node initiates interactions
at the instants of a rate-one Poisson process, and at each of these instants, picks a node at random to
6
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Figure 1: A signed social network.
interact with. Under this model, at a given time, at most one node initiates an interaction. This allows
us to order interaction events in time and to focus on modeling the node pair selection at interaction
times. The node selection process is characterized by an n × n stochastic matrix P = [pij ] complying
with the graph G, in the sense that pij > 0 always implies {i, j} ∈ E for i 6= j ∈ V. The pij represents the
probability that node i initiates an interaction with node j. The node pair selection is then performed
as follows.
Definition 1 At each interaction event k ≥ 0, (i) a node i ∈ V is drawn uniformly at random, i.e., with
probability 1/n; (ii) node i picks node j with probability pij. In this case, we say that the unordered node
pair {i, j} is selected.
The node pair selection process is assumed to be i.i.d., i.e., the nodes that initiate an interaction
and the selected node pairs are identically distributed and independent over k ≥ 0. Formally, the node
selection process can be analyzed using the following probability spaces. Let (E,S, µ) be the probability
space, where S is the discrete σ-algebra on E, and µ is the probability measure defined by µ({i, j}) =
pij+pji
n for all {i, j} ∈ E. The node selection process can then be seen as a random event in the product
probability space (Ω,F ,P), where Ω = EN = {ω = (ω0, ω1, . . . , ) : ∀k, ωk ∈ E}, F = SN, and P is
the product probability measure (uniquely) defined by: for any finite subset K ⊂ N, P((ωk)k∈K) =∏
k∈K µ(ωk) for any (ωk)k∈K ∈ E|K|. For any k ∈ N, we define the coordinate mapping Gk : Ω → E by
Gk(ω) = ωk, for all ω ∈ Ω (note that P(Gk = ωk) = µ(ωk)), and we refer to (Gk, k = 0, 1, . . .) as the node
pair selection process. We further refer to Fk = σ(G0, . . . , Gk) as the σ-algebra capturing the (k + 1)
first interactions of the selection process.
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2.2 Positive and Negative Dynamics
Each node maintains a scalar real-valued opinion, or belief, which it updates whenever it interacts with
other nodes. We let x(k) ∈ Rn denote the vector of the beliefs held by nodes at the interaction event k.
The belief update depends on the relationship between the interacting nodes. Suppose that node pair
{i, j} is selected at time k. The nodes that are not selected keep their beliefs unchanged, whereas the
beliefs held by nodes i and j are updated as follows:
• (Positive Update) If {i, j} ∈ Epst, either node m ∈ {i, j} updates its belief as
xm(k + 1) = xm(k) + α
(
x−m(k)− xm(k)
)
= (1− α)xm(k) + αx−m(k), (1)
where −m ∈ {i, j} \ {m} and 0 ≤ α ≤ 1.
• (Negative Update) If {i, j} ∈ Eneg, either node m ∈ {i, j} updates its belief as
xm(k + 1) = xm(k)− β
(
x−m(k)− xm(k)
)
= (1 + β)xm(k)− βx−m(k), (2)
where β ≥ 0.
The positive update is consistent with the classical DeGroot model (DeGroot (1974)), where each
node iteratively updates its belief as a convex combination of the previous beliefs of itself and of the
neighbor with which it interacts. This update naturally reflects trustful or cooperative relationships. It
is sometimes referred to as na¨ıve learning in social networks, under which wisdom can be held by the
crowds (Golub and Jackson (2010)). The positive update tends to drive node beliefs closer to each other
and can be thought of as the attraction of the beliefs.
The dynamics on the negative edges, on the other hand, is not yet universally agreed upon in the
literature. Considerable efforts have been made to characterize these mistrustful or antagonistic rela-
tionships, which has led to a number of insightful models, e.g., Acemoglu et al. (2010, 2013), Altafini
(2012, 2013). Our negative update rule enforces belief differences between interacting nodes, and is the
opposite of the attraction of beliefs represented by the positive update.
2.3 Model Rationale
2.3.1 Relation to Non-Bayesian Rules
Our underlying signed graph is a prescribed world with fixed trust or mistrustful relations where nodes
do not switch their relations. Two nodes holding the same opinion can be enemies, and vice versa. This
8
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contrasts Krause’s model, where trustful relations are state-dependent and nodes only interact with
nodes which hold similar opinions, i.e., whose beliefs are within a given distance.
In our model, the signed graph classifies the social interactions into two categories, positive and
negative, each with its own type of dynamics. Studies of stubborn agents in social network Acemoglu
et al. (2013), Yildiz et al. (2013) also classify nodes into two categories, but stubborn agents do not
account for the opinion of its neighbors. Our model is more similar to the one introduced by Altafini
in Altafini (2013), where the author proposed a different update rule for two nodes sharing a negative
link. The model in Altafini (2013) is written in continuous time (beliefs evolve along some ODE), but
its corresponding discrete-time update across a negative link {i, j} ∈ Eneg is:
xm(k + 1) = xm(k)− β
(
x−m(k) + xm(k)
)
= (1− β)xm(k)− βx−m(k), m ∈ {i, j}, (3)
where β ∈ (0, 1) represents the negative strength. This update rule admits the following interpretations:
• Node i attempts to trick her negative neighbors j, by flipping the sign of her true belief (i.e., xi(k)
to −xi(k)) before revealing it to j;
• Node i recognizes j as her negative neighbor and upon observing j’s true belief, xj(k), she tries to
get closer to the opposite view of j since xi(k + 1) is a convex combination of xi(k) and −xj(k).
In both of the two interpretations of the Altafini model, the belief origin must be of some particular
significance in the nodes’ belief space. This is not the case for our model, where the positive/negative
dynamics describe choices intended to keeping close to friends and keeping distance from enemies. When
nodes i and j perform a negative update in our model, if xi(k) > xj(k) then xi(k + 1) > xi(k) and if
xi(k) < xj(k) then xi(k+ 1) < xi(k). That is, in either case, the node’s updated opinion is in a direction
away from the opinion of the interacting node (i.e., nodes make an effort to “keep distance from the
enemies” and do not assign any special meaning to the belief origin).
Remark 1 The Altafini model Altafini (2013) and the current work are intended for building theories
to opinion dynamics over signed social networks. Indeed nontrivial efforts have been made to model
the dynamics of signed social networks themselves Galam (1996), Macy et al. (2003), Marvel et al.
(2011). It is intriguing to ask how opinions and social networks shape each other in the presence of
trustful/mistrustful relations, where fundamental difficulty arises in how to properly model such couplings
as well as the challenges brought by the couplings.
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2.3.2 Relation to Bayesian Rules
Bayesian opinion dynamics assume that there is a global model of the world and individuals aim to
realize asymptotic learning of the underlying world Banerjee (1992), Bikhchandani et al. (1992),
Acemoglu et al. (2011). It has been shown that DeGroot update can also serve as a naive learning
approach as long as the network somehow contains no dictators Golub and Jackson (2010).
We argue here our model corresponds to the situation where nodes naively follow the code of keeping
distance with enemies and keeping close to friends, rather than having interest in some underlying world
model. Our definition of the negative dynamics becomes quite natural if one views the DeGroot type of
update as the approach of keeping close to friends. This simple yet informative model leads to a number of
nontrivial belief formations in terms of convergence or divergence for unconstrained evolution, consensus,
clustering, or oscillation under boundedness constraint.
We note that it is an interesting open challenge to find a proper model for Bayesian learning over
signed social networks, since nodes must learn in the presence of negative interactions, on the one hand,
and may try to prevent their enemies from asymptotic learning, on the other.
3 Mean and Mean-square Convergence/Divergence
Let x(k) = (x1(k) . . . xn(k))
′, k = 0, 1, . . . be the (random) vector of beliefs at time k resulting from the
node interactions. The initial beliefs x(0), also denoted as x0, is assumed to be deterministic. In this
section, we investigate the mean and mean-square evolution of the beliefs for the considered signed social
network. We introduce the following definition.
Definition 2 (i) Belief convergence is achieved in expectation if limk→∞ E
{
xi(k)− xj(k)
}
= 0 for all
i and j; in mean square if limk→∞ E
{
(xi(k)− xj(k))2
}
= 0 for all i and j.
(ii) Belief divergence is achieved in expectation if lim supk→∞ maxi,j
∣∣E{xi(k) − xj(k)}∣∣ = ∞; in
mean square if lim supk→∞maxi,j E
{
(xi(k)− xj(k))2
}
=∞.
The belief dynamics as described above can be written as:
x(k + 1) = W (k)x(k), (4)
where W (k), k = 0, 1, . . . are i.i.d. random matrices satisfying
P
(
W (k) = W+ij := I − α(ei − ej)(ei − ej)′
)
=
pij + pji
n
, {i, j} ∈ Epst,
P
(
W (k) = W−ij := I + β(ei − ej)(ei − ej)′
)
=
pij + pji
n
, {i, j} ∈ Eneg,
(5)
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and em = (0 . . . 0 1 0 . . . 0)
′ is the n-dimensional unit vector whose m-th component is 1. In this section,
we use spectral properties of the linear system (4) to study convergence and divergence in mean and
mean-square. Our results can be seen as extensions of existing convergence results on deterministic
consensus algorithms, e.g., Xiao and Boyd (2004).
3.1 Convergence in Mean
We first provide conditions for convergence and divergence in mean. We then exploit these conditions
to establish the existence of a phase transition for convergence when the negative update parameter β
increases. These results are illustrated at the end of this subsection. For technical reasons we adopt the
following assumption in this subsection.
Assumption 2 There holds either (i) pii ≥ 1/2 for all i ∈ V, or (ii) P = [pij ] is doubly stochastic with
n ≥ 4.
Generalization to the case when Assumption 2 does not hold is essentially straightforward but under
a bit more careful treatment.
3.1.1 Convergence/Divergence Conditions
Denote P † = (P + P ′)/n. We write P † = P †pst + P
†
neg, where P
†
pst and P
†
neg correspond to the positive
and negative graphs, respectively. Specifically, [P †pst]ij = [P †]ij if {i, j} ∈ Epst and [P †pst]ij = 0 otherwise,
while [P †neg]ij = [P †]ij if {i, j} ∈ Eneg and [P †neg]ij = 0 otherwise. We further introduce the degree
matrix D†pst = diag(d
+
1 . . . d
+
n ) of the positive graph, where d
+
i =
∑n
j=1,j 6=i[P
†
pst]ij . Similarly, the degree
matrix of the negative graph is defined as D†neg = diag(d−1 . . . d
−
n ) with d
−
i =
∑n
j=1,j 6=i[P
†
neg]ij . Then
L†pst = D
†
pst − P †pst and L†neg = D†neg − P †neg represent the (weighted) Laplacian matrices of the positive
graph Gpst and negative graph Gneg, respectively. It can be easily deduced from (5) that
E{W (k)} = I − αL†pst + βL†neg. (6)
Clearly, 1′E{W (k)} = E{W (k)}1 = 1 where 1 = (1 . . . 1)′ denotes the n × 1 vector of all ones, but
E{W (k)} is not necessarily a stochastic matrix since it may contain negative entries.
Introduce yi(k) = xi(k) −
∑n
s=1 xs(k)/n and let y(k) = (y1(k) . . . yn(k))
′. Define U := 11′/n and
note that y(k) = (I − U)x(k); furthermore, (I − U)W (k) = W (k)(I − U) = W (k) − U for all possible
realizations of W (k). Hence, the evolution of E{y(k)} is linear:
E{y(k + 1)} = E{(I − U)W (k)x(k)} = E{(I − U)W (k)(I − U)x(k)} = (E{W (k)} − U)E{y(k)}.
11
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The following elementary inequalities∣∣E{xi(k)− xj(k)}∣∣ ≤ ∣∣E{yi(k)}∣∣+ ∣∣E{yj(k)}∣∣, ∣∣E{yi(k)}∣∣ ≤ 1
n
E
n∑
s=1
|xi(k)− xs(k)| (7)
imply that belief convergence in expectation is equivalent to limk→∞ |E{y(k)}| = 0, and belief divergence
is equivalent to lim supk→∞ |E{y(k)}| =∞. Belief convergence or divergence is hence determined by the
spectral radius of E{W (k)} − U .
With Assumption 2, there always holds that
d+i =
n∑
j=1,j 6=i
[P †pst]ij ≤
n∑
j=1,j 6=i
(
pij + pji
)
/n ≤ 1/2.
As a result, Gersˇhgorin’s Circle Theorem (see, e.g., Theorem 6.1.1 in Horn and Johnson (1985)) guaran-
tees that each eigenvalue of I−αL†pst is nonnegative. It then follows that each eigenvalue of I−αL†pst−U
is nonnegative since L†pstU = UL
†
pst = 0 and the two matrices I−αL†pst and U share the same eigenvector
1 for eigenvalue one. Moreover, it is well known in algebraic graph theory that L†pst and L
†
neg are positive
semi-definite matrices. As a result, Weyl’s inequality (see Theorem 4.3.1 in Horn and Johnson (1985))
further ensures that each eigenvalue of E{W (k)}−U is also nonnegative. To summarize, we have shown
that:
Proposition 1 Let Assumption 2 hold. Belief convergence is achieved in expectation for all initial values
if λmax
(
I − αL†pst + βL†neg − U
)
< 1; belief divergence is achieved in expectation for almost all initial
values if λmax
(
I − αL†pst + βL†neg − U
)
> 1.
In the above proposition and what follows, λmax(M) denotes the largest eigenvalue of the real sym-
metric matrix M , and by “almost all initial conditions,” we mean that the property holds for any initial
condition y(0) except if y(0) is perfectly orthogonal to the eigenspace of E{W (k)} − U corresponding
to its maximal eigenvalue λmax
(
I − αL†pst + βL†neg − U
)
. Hence the set of initial conditions where the
property does not hold has zero Lebesgue measure.
The Courant-Fischer Theorem (see Theorem 4.2.11 in Horn and Johnson (1985)) implies
λmax
(
I − αL†pst + βL†neg − U
)
= sup
|z|=1
z′
(
I − αL†pst + βL†neg − U
)
z
= 1 + sup
|z|=1
[
− α
∑
{i,j}∈Epst
[P †]ij(zi − zj)2 + β
∑
{i,j}∈Eneg
[P †]ij(zi − zj)2 − 1
n
( n∑
i=1
zi
)2]
. (8)
We see from (8) that the influence of Gpst and Gneg on the belief convergence/divergence in mean are
separated: links in Epst contribute to belief convergence, while links in Eneg contribute to belief divergence.
As will be shown later on, this separation property no longer holds for mean-square convergence, and
there may be a non-trivial correlation between the influence of Epst and that of Eneg.
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3.1.2 Phase Transition
Next we study the impact of update parameters α and β on the convergence in expectation. Define
f(α, β) := λmax
(
I −αL†pst + βL†neg −U
)
. The function f has the following properties under Assumption
2:
(i) (Convexity) Since both L†pst and L
†
neg are symmetric, f(α, β) is the spectral norm of I − αL†pst +
βL†neg − U . As every matrix norm is convex, we have
f(γ(α1, β1) + (1− γ(α2, β2)) ≤ γf(α1, β1) + (1− γ)f(α2, β2) (9)
for all γ ∈ [0, 1] and α1, α2, β1, β2 ∈ R. This implies that f(α, β) is convex in (α, β).
(ii) (Monotonicity) From (8), f(α, β) is non-increasing in α for fixed β, and non-decreasing in β for
fixed α. As a result, setting α = 1 provides the fastest convergence whenever belief convergence in
expectation is achieved (for a given fixed β). Note that when α = 1, when two nodes interact, they
simply switch their beliefs.
When Gpst is connected, the second smallest eigenvalue of L
†
pst, denoted by λ2(L
†
pst), is positive. We
can readily see that f(α, 0) = 1−αλ2(L†pst) < 1. From (8), we also have f(α, β)→∞ as β →∞ provided
that Gneg is nonempty. Combining these observations with the monotonicity of f , we conclude that:
Proposition 2 Assume that Gpst is connected and let Assumption 2 hold. Then for any fixed α ∈ (0, 1],
there exists a threshold value β? > 0 (that depends on α) such that
(i) Belief convergence in expectation is achieved for all initial values if 0 ≤ β < β?;
(ii) Belief divergence in expectation is achieved for almost all initial values if β > β?.
We remark that belief divergence can only happen for almost all initial values since if the initial beliefs
of all the nodes are identical, they do not evolve over time.
3.1.3 Examples
An interesting question is to determine how the phase transition threshold β? scales with the network size.
Answering this question seems challenging. However there are networks for which we can characterize
β? exactly. Next we derive explicit expressions for β? when G is a complete graph or a ring graph. These
two topologies represent the most dense and almost the most sparse structures for a connected network.
13
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Example 1 (Complete Graph) Let G = Kn, where Kn is the complete graph with n nodes, and con-
sider the node pair selection matrix P = (11′ − I)/(n− 1). Let L(Kn) = nI − 11′ be the Laplacian of
Kn. Then L(Kn) has eigenvalue 0 with multiplicity 1 and eigenvalue n with multiplicity n − 1. Define
L(Gneg) as the standard Laplacian of Gneg. Observe that
I − αL†pst + βL†neg − U = I − α(L†pst + L†neg) + (α+ β)L†neg − U
= I − 2α
n(n− 1)L(Kn) +
2(α+ β)
n(n− 1) L(Gneg)− U. (10)
Also note that L(Gneg)L(Kn) = L(Kn)L(Gneg) = nL(Gneg). From these observations, we can then readily
conclude that:
β? =
nα
λmax(L(Gneg))
− α. (11)
Example 2 (Erdo˝s-Re´nyi Negative Graph over Complete Graph) Let G = Kn with
P = (11′ − I)/(n− 1).
Let Gneg be the Erdo˝s-Re´nyi random graph (Erdo˝s and Re´nyi (1960)) where for any i, j ∈ V, {i, j} ∈ Eneg
with probability p (independently of other links). Note that since Gneg is a random subgraph, the function
f(α, β) becomes a random variable, and we denote by P the probability measure related to the randomness
of the graph in Erdo˝s-Re´nyi’s model. Spectral theory for random graphs suggests that (Ding and Jiang
(2010))
λmax(L(Gneg))
pn
→ 1, as n→∞ (12)
in probability. Now for fixed p, we deduce from (11) and (12) that the threshold β? converges, as n grows
large, to α/p in probability. Now let us fix the update parameters α and β, and investigate the impact of
the probability p on the convergence in mean.
• If p < αα+β , we show that P[f(α, β) < 1] → 1, when n → ∞, i.e., when the network is large, we
likely achieve convergence in mean. Let  < α(α+β)p − 1. It follows from (12) that
P(f(α, β) < 1) = P
(
1− 2α
n(n− 1)n+
2(α+ β)
n(n− 1)λmax
(
L(Gneg)) < 1
)
= P
(
(α+ β)λmax
(
L(Gneg)) < αn
)
= P
(λmax(L(Gneg))
pn
<
α
(α+ β)p
)
≥ P
(∣∣∣λmax(L(Gneg))
pn
− 1
∣∣∣ < )→ 1, as n→∞. (13)
14
Shi et al. Belief Evolution over Signed Social Networks
• If p > αα+β , we similarly establish that P(f(α, β) > 1) → 1, when n → ∞, i.e., when the network
is large, we observe divergence in mean with high probability.
Hence we have a sharp phase transition between convergence and divergence in mean when the proportion
of negative links p increases and goes above the threshold p? = α/(α+ β).
Example 3 (Ring Graph) Denote Rn as the ring graph with n nodes. Let A(Rn) and L(Rn) be the
adjacency and Laplacian matrices of Rn, respectively. Let the underlying graph G = Rn with only one
negative link (if one has more than two negative links, it is easy to see that divergence in expectation is
achieved irrespective of β > 0). Take P = A(Rn)/2. We know that L(Rn) has eigenvalues 2−2 cos(2pik/n),
0 ≤ k ≤ n/2. Applying Weyl’s inequality we obtain f(α, β) ≥ 1 + (β − α)/n. We conclude that β? < α,
irrespective of n.
3.2 Mean-square Convergence
We now turn our attention to the analysis of the mean-square convergence and divergence. Define:
E{|y(k)|2} = E{x(k)′(I − U)x(k)}
= x(0)′E{W (0) . . .W (k − 1)(I − U)W (k − 1) . . .W (0)}x(0). (14)
Again based on inequalities (7), we see that belief convergence in mean square is equivalent to
lim
k→∞
E{|y(k)|2} = 0,
and belief divergence to lim supk→∞ E{|y(k)|2} =∞. Define:
Φ(k) =

E{W (0) . . .W (k − 1)(I − U)W (k − 1) . . .W (0)}, k ≥ 1,
I − U, k = 0.
(15)
Then, Φ(k) evolves as a linear dynamical system (Fagnani and Zampieri (2008))
Φ(k) = E
{
W (0) . . .W (k − 1)(I − U)W (k − 1) . . .W (0)}
= E
{
W (0)(I − U)W (1) . . .W (k − 1)(I − U)W (k − 1) . . .W (1)(I − U)W (0)}
= E{(W (k)− U)Φ(k − 1)(W (k)− U)}, (16)
where in the second equality we have used the facts that (I − U)2 = I − U and (I − U)W (k) =
W (k)(I − U) = W (k) − U for all possible realizations of W (k), and the third equality is due to that
W (k) and W (0) are i.i.d. We can rewrite (16) using an equivalent vector form:
vec(Φ(k)) = Θvec(Φ(k − 1)), (17)
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where Θ is the matrix in Rn
2×n2 given by
Θ = E{(W (0)− U)⊗ (W (0)− U)}
=
∑
{i,j}∈Gpst
[P †]ij
((
W+ij − U
)⊗ (W+ij − U))+ ∑
{i,j}∈Gneg
[P †]ij
((
W−ij − U
)⊗ (W−ij − U)).
Let Sλ be the eigenspace corresponding to an eigenvalue λ of Θ. Define
λ? := max{λ ∈ σ(Θ) : vec(I − U) /∈ S⊥λ },
which denotes the spectral radius of Θ restricted to the smallest invariant subspace containing vec(I−U),
i.e., S := span{Θkvec(I − U), k = 0, 1, . . . }. Then mean-square belief convergence/divergence is fully
determined by λ?: convergence in mean square for all initial conditions is achieved if λ? < 1, and
divergence for almost all initial conditions is achieved if λ? > 1.
Observing that λ ≤ 1 for every λ ∈ σ(W+ij) and λ ≥ 1 for every λ ∈ σ(W−ij), we can also conclude
that each link in Epst contributes positively to λmax(Θ) and each link in Eneg contributes negatively to
λmax(Θ). However, unlike in the case of the analysis of convergence in expectation, although λ? defines a
precise threshold for the phase-transition between mean-square convergence and divergence, it is difficult
to determine the influence Epst and Eneg have on λ?. The reason is that they are coupled in a nontrivial
manner for the invariant subspace S. Nevertheless, we are still able to propose the following conditions
for mean-square belief convergence and divergence:
Proposition 3 Belief convergence is achieved for all initial values in mean square if
λmax
(
I − 2α(1− α)L†pst + 2β(1 + β)L†neg − U
)
< 1;
belief divergence is achieved in mean square for almost all initial values if
λmax
(
I − αL†pst + βL†neg − U
)
> 1
or
λmin
(
I − 2α(1− α)L†pst + 2β(1 + β)L†neg − U
)
> 1.
The condition λmax
(
I − αL†pst + βL†neg − U
)
is sufficient for mean square divergence, in view of
Proposition 1 and the fact that L1 divergence implies Lp divergence for all p ≥ 1. The other conditions
are essentially consistent with the upper and lower bounds of λ? established in Proposition 4.4 of Fagnani
and Zampieri (2008). Proposition 3 is a consequence of Lemma 3 (see Appendix), as explained in Remark
5.
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4 Almost Sure Convergence/Divergence
In this section, we explore the almost sure convergence of beliefs in signed social networks. We introduce
the following definition.
Definition 3 Belief convergence is achieved almost surely (a.s.) if P
(
limk→∞
∣∣xi(k)− xj(k)∣∣ = 0) = 1
for all i and j; Belief divergence is achieved almost surely if P
(
lim supk→∞maxi,j
∣∣xi(k)−xj(k)∣∣ =∞) =
1.
Basic probability theory tells us that mean-square belief convergence implies belief convergence in
expectation (mean convergence), and similarly belief divergence in expectation implies belief diver-
gence in mean square. However, in general there is no direct connection between almost sure conver-
gence/divergence and mean or mean-square convergence/divergence. Finally observe that, a priori, it is
not clear that either a.s. convergence or a.s. divergence should be achieved.
While the analysis of the convergence of beliefs in mean and square-mean mainly relied on spectral
arguments, we need more involved probabilistic methods (e.g., sample-path arguments, martingale con-
vergence theorems) to study almost sure convergence or divergence. We first establish two insightful
properties of the belief evolutions: (i) the no-survivor property stating that in case of almost sure di-
vergence, the difference between the beliefs of any two nodes in the network tends to infinity (along a
subsequence of instants); (ii) the live-or-die property which essentially states that the maximum differ-
ence between the beliefs of any two nodes either grows to infinity, or vanishes to zero. We then show a
zero-one law and a phase transition of almost sure convergence/divergence. Finally, we investigate the
robustness of networks against negative links. More specifically, we show that when the graph Gpst of
positive links contains an hypercube, and when the positive updates are truly averaging, i.e., α = 1/2,
then almost sure belief convergence is reached in finite time, irrespective of the number of negative links,
their positions in the network, and the negative update parameter β. We believe that these are the only
networks enjoying this strong robustness property.
4.1 The No-Survivor Theorem
The following theorem establishes that in the case of almost sure divergence, there is no pair of nodes
that can survive this divergence: for any two nodes, the difference in their beliefs grow arbitrarily large.
Theorem 1 (No-Survivor) Fix the initial condition and assume almost sure belief divergence. Then
P
(
lim supk→∞
∣∣xi(k)− xj(k)∣∣ =∞) = 1 for all i 6= j ∈ V.
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Observe that the above result only holds for the almost sure divergence. We may easily build simple
network examples where we have belief divergence in expectation (or mean square), but where some
node pairs survive, in the sense that the difference in their beliefs vanishes (or at least bounded). The
no-survivor theorem indicates that to check almost sure divergence, we may just observe the evolution
of beliefs held at two arbitrary nodes in the network.
4.2 The Live-or-Die lemma and Zero-One Laws
Next we further classify the ways beliefs can evolve. Specifically, we study the following events:
for any initial beliefs x0,
Cx0
.
=
{
lim sup
k→∞
max
i,j
|xi(k)− xj(k)| = 0
}
, Dx0
.
=
{
lim sup
k→∞
max
i,j
|xi(k)− xj(k)| =∞
}
,
C ∗x0
.
=
{
lim inf
k→∞
max
i,j
|xi(k)− xj(k)| = 0
}
, D∗x0
.
=
{
lim inf
k→∞
max
i,j
|xi(k)− xj(k)| =∞
}
,
and
C
.
=
{
lim sup
k→∞
max
i,j
|xi(k)− xj(k)| = 0 for all x0 ∈ Rn
}
,
D
.
=
{∃ (deterministic) x0 ∈ Rn, s.t. lim sup
k→∞
max
i,j
|xi(k)− xj(k)| =∞
}
.
We establish that the maximum difference between the beliefs of any two nodes either goes to ∞, or
to zero. This result is referred to as live-or-die lemma:
Lemma 1 (Live-or-Die) Let α ∈ (0, 1) and β > 0. Suppose Gpst is connected. Then (i) P(Cx0)+P(Dx0) =
1; (ii) P(C ∗x0) + P(D
∗
x0) = 1.
As a consequence, almost surely, one of the following events happens:
{
lim
k→∞
max
i,j
|xi(k)− xj(k)| = 0
}
;{
lim
k→∞
max
i,j
|xi(k)− xj(k)| =∞
}
;{
lim inf
k→∞
max
i,j
|xi(k)− xj(k)| = 0; lim sup
k→∞
max
i,j
|xi(k)− xj(k)| =∞
}
.
The Live-or-Die lemma deals with events where the initial beliefs have been fixed. We may prove
stronger results on the probabilities of events that hold for any initial condition, e.g., C , or for at least
one initial condition, e.g., D :
Theorem 2 (Zero-One Law) Let α ∈ [0, 1] and β > 0. Both C and D are trivial events (i.e., each of
them occurs with probability equal to either 1 or 0) and P(C ) + P(D) = 1.
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To prove this result, we show that C is a tail event, and hence trivial in view of Kolmogorov’s zero-
one law (the same kind of arguments has been used by Tahbaz-Salehi and Jadbabaie (2008)). From the
Live-or-Die lemma, we then simply deduce that D is also a trivial event. Note that Cx0 and Dx0 may
not be trivial events. In fact, we can build examples where P(Cx0) = 1/2 and P(Dx0) = 1/2.
4.3 Phase Transition
As for the convergence in expectation, for fixed positive update parameter α, we are able to establish
the existence of thresholds for the value β of the negative update parameter, which characterizes the
almost sure belief convergence and divergence.
Theorem 3 (Phase Transition) Suppose Gpst is connected. Fix α ∈ (0, 1) with α 6= 1/2. Then
(i) there exists β\(α) > 0 such that P(C ) = 1 if 0 ≤ β < β\;
(ii) there exists β](α) > 0 such that P(lim infk→∞maxi,j |xi(k)−xj(k)| =∞) = 1 for almost all initial
values if β > β].
It should be observed that the divergence condition in (ii) is stronger than our notion of almost sure
belief divergence (the maximum belief difference between two nodes diverge almost surely to ∞). Also
note that β\ ≤ β], and we were not able to show that the gap between these two thresholds vanishes (as
in the case of belief convergence in expectation or mean-square).
4.4 Robustness to Negative Links: the Hypercube
We have seen in Theorem 3 that when α 6= 1/2, one single negative link is capable of driving the network
beliefs to almost sure divergence as long as β is sufficiently large. The following result shows that the
evolution of the beliefs can be robust against negative links. This is the case when nodes can reach an
agreement in finite time. In what follows, we provide conditions on α and the structure of the graph
under which finite time belief convergence is reached.
Proposition 4 Suppose there exist an integer T ≥ 1 and a finite sequence of node pairs {is, js} ∈
Gpst, s = 1, 2, . . . , T such that W
+
iT jT
· · ·W+i1j1 = U . Then P(C ) = 1 for all β ≥ 0.
Proposition 4 is a direct consequence of the Borel-Cantelli Lemma. If there is a finite sequence of node
pairs {is, js} ∈ Gpst, s = 1, 2, . . . , T such that W+iT jT · · ·W+i1j1 = U , then
P
(
W (k + T ) · · ·W (k + 1) = U
)
≥
(p∗
n
)T
,
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Figure 2: The hypercubes H1, H2, and H3.
for all k ≥ 0, where p∗ = min{pij + pji : {i, j} ∈ E}. Noting that UW (k) = W (k)U = U for all possible
realizations of W (k), the Borel-Cantelli Lemma guarantees that
P
(
lim
k→∞
W (k) · · ·W (0) = U
)
= 1
for all β ≥ 0, or equivalently, P(C ) = 1 for all β ≥ 0. This proves Proposition 4.
The existence of such finite sequence of node pairs under which the beliefs of the nodes in the network
reach a common value in finite time is crucial (we believe that this condition is actually necessary) to
ensure that the influence of Gneg vanishes. It seems challenging to know whether this is at all possible.
As it turns out, the structure of the positive graph plays a fundamental role. To see that, we first provide
some definitions.
Definition 4 Let G1 = (V1,E1) and G2 = (V2,E2) be a pair of graphs. The Cartesian product of G1 and
G2, denoted by G1G2, is defined by
(i) the vertex set of G1G2 is V1 × V2, where V1 × V2 is the Cartesian product of V1 and V2;
(ii) for any two vertices (v1, v2), (u1, u2) ∈ V1 × V2, there is an edge between them in G1G2 if and
only if either v1 = u1 and {v2, u2} ∈ E2, or v2 = u2 and {v1, u1} ∈ E1.
Let K2 be the complete graph with two nodes. The m-dimensional Hypercube H
m is then defined as
Hm = K2K2 . . .K2︸ ︷︷ ︸
m times
.
An illustration of hypercubes is in Figure 2.
The following result provides sufficient conditions to achieve finite-time convergence.
Proposition 5 If α = 1/2, n = 2m for some integer m > 0, and Gpst has a subgraph isomorphic with
an m-dimensional hypercube, then there exists a sequence of (n log2 n)/2 node pairs {is, js} ∈ Gpst, s =
1, . . . , (n log2 n)/2 such that W
+
i(n log2 n)/2j(n log2 n)/2
· · ·W+i1j1 = U .
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Next we derive necessary conditions for finite time convergence. Let us first recall the following
definition.
Definition 5 Let G = (V,E) be a graph. A matching of G is a set of pairwise non-adjacent edges in the
sense that no two edges share a common vertex. A perfect matching of G is a matching which matches
all vertices.
Proposition 6 If there exist an integer T ≥ 1 and a sequence of node pairs {is, js} ∈ Gpst, s = 1, 2, . . . , T
such that W+iT jT · · ·W+i1j1 = U , then α = 1/2, n = 2m, and Gpst has a perfect matching.
In fact, in the proof of Proposition 6, we show that if W+iT jT · · ·W+i1j1 = U , then a subset of{{i1, j1}, . . . , {iT , jT }}
forms a perfect matching of Gpst.
We have seen that the belief dynamics and convergence can be robust against negative links, but this
robustness comes at the expense of strong conditions on the number of the nodes and the structure of
the positive graph.
5 Belief Clustering and Structural Balance
So far we have studied the belief dynamics when the node interactions are symmetric, and the values
of beliefs are unconstrained. The results illustrate that often either convergence or divergence can be
predicted for the social-network beliefs. Although this symmetric and unconstrained belief update rule
is plausible for ideal social network models, in reality these assumptions might not hold, that is: when
{i, j} is selected, it might happen that only one of the two nodes in i and j updates its belief; there
might be a hard constraint on beliefs: xi(k) ∈ [−A,A] for all i and k, and for some A > 0.
In this section, we consider the following model for the updates of the beliefs. Define:
PA(z) =

−A, if z < −A;
z, if z ∈ [−A,A];
A, if z > A.
(18)
Let a, b, c > 0 be three positive real numbers such that a+ b+ c = 1, and define the function θ : E→ R
so that θ({i, j}) = α if {i, j} ∈ Epst and θ({i, j}) = −β if {i, j} ∈ Eneg. Assume that node i interacts
with node j at time k. Nodes i and j update their beliefs as:
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[Asymmetric and Constrained Belief Evolution]
xi(k + 1) =PA
(
(1− θ)xi(k) + θxj(k)
)
and xj(k + 1) = xj(k), with probability a;
xj(k + 1) =PA
(
(1− θ)xj(k) + θxi(k)
)
and xi(k + 1) = xi(k), with probability b;
xm(k + 1) =PA
(
(1− θ)xm(k) + θx−m(k)
)
, m ∈ {i, j}, with probability c.
(19)
Enforcing the belief within the interval [−A,A] can be viewed as a social member’s decision based on
her fundamental model of the world. With asymmetric and constrained belief evolution, the dynamics
become essentially nonlinear, which brings new challenges in the analysis. We continue to use P to denote
the overall probability measure capturing the randomness of the updates in the asymmetric constrained
model.
5.1 Balanced Graphs and Clustering
We introduce the notion of balance for signed graphs, for which we refer to Wasserman and Faust (1994)
for a comprehensive discussion.
Definition 6 Let G = (V,E) be a signed graph. Then
(i) G is weakly balanced if there is an integer k ≥ 2 and a partition of V = V1 ∪ V2 · · · ∪ Vk, where
V1, . . . ,Vk are nonempty and mutually disjoint, such that any edge between different Vi’s is negative,
and any edge within each Vi is positive.
(ii) G is strongly balanced if it is weakly balanced with k = 2.
Harary’s balance theorem states that a signed graph G is strongly balanced if and only if there is no
cycle with an odd number of negative edges in G (Cartwright and Harary (1956)), while G is weakly
balanced if and only if no cycle has exactly one negative edge in G (Davis (1967)).
It turned out that, with certain balance of the underlying graph, clustering arises for the social-network
beliefs. We make the following definition.
Definition 7 (i) Let G be strongly balanced subject to partition V = V1∪V2. Then almost sure boundary
belief clustering for the initial value x0 is achieved if there are two random variables B†1(x
0) and B†2(x
0),
both taking values in {−A,A}, such that:
P
(
lim
k→∞
xi(k) = B
†
1(x
0), i ∈ V1; lim
k→∞
xi(k) = B
†
2(x
0), i ∈ V2
)
= 1. (20)
(ii) Let G be weakly balanced subject to partition V = V1∪V2 · · ·∪Vm for some m ≥ 2. Then almost sure
boundary belief clustering for the initial value x0 is achieved if there are there are m random variables,
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B]1(x
0), . . . , B]m(x0), each of which taking values in {−A,A}, such that:
P
(
lim
k→∞
xi(k) = B
]
j(x
0), i ∈ Vj , j = 1, . . . ,m
)
= 1. (21)
In the case of strongly balanced graphs, we can show that beliefs are asymptotically clustered when
β is large enough, as stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 4 Assume that G is strongly balanced under partition V = V1 ∪V2, and that GV1 and GV2 are
connected. For any α ∈ (0, 1) \ {1/2}, when β is sufficiently large, for almost all initial values x0, almost
sure boundary belief clustering is achieved under the update rule (19).
In fact, there holds B†1(x
0) + B†2(x
0) = 0 almost surely in the above boundary belief clustering for
strongly balanced social networks. Theorem 4 states that, for strongly balanced social networks, beliefs
are eventually polarized to the two opinion boundaries.
The analysis of belief dynamics in weakly balanced graphs is more involved, and we restrict our
attention to complete graphs. In social networks, this case means that everyone knows everyone else –
which constitutes a suitable model for certain social groups of small sizes (a classroom, a sport team,
or the UN, see Easley and Kleinberg (2010)). As stated in the following theorem, for weakly balanced
complete graphs, beliefs are again clustered.
Theorem 5 Assume that G is a complete and weakly balanced graph under the partition V = V1∪V2 · · ·∪
Vm with m ≥ 2. Further assume that GVj , j = 1, . . . ,m are connected. For any α ∈ (0, 1)\{1/2}, when β
is sufficiently large, almost sure boundary belief clustering is achieved for almost all initial values under
(19).
Remark 2 Under the model (3), it can be shown (cf., Altafini (2013), Shi et al. (2015))
(i) if G is strongly balanced and β ∈ (0, 1), then there are two values z1(x0) and z2(x0) such that
P
(
lim
k→∞
xi(k) = z1(x
0), i ∈ V1, lim
k→∞
xi(k) = z2(x
0), i ∈ V2
)
= 1. (22)
(ii) if G is not strongly balanced (i.e., even if it is weakly balanced) and β ∈ (0, 1), then
P
(
lim
k→∞
xi(k) = 0, i ∈ V
)
= 1, (23)
where the impact of the initial beliefs are entirely erased from the asymptotic limit.
Our Theorem 4 appears to be similar to (22), but the clustering in Theorem 4 is due to fundamentally
different reasons: besides the strong balance of the social network, it is the nonlinearity in the constrained
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update (PA(·)), and the sufficiently large β that makes the boundary clustering arise in Theorem 4. In
contrast, (22) is resulted from the crucial condition that β ∈ (0, 1). Under the Altafini model (3), even
when β is sufficiently large, it is easy to see that the boundary clustering in Theorem 5 can never happen
for weakly balanced graphs.
The distribution of the clustering limits established in Theorems 4 and 5 relies on the initial value. In
this way, the initial beliefs make an impact on the final belief limit, which is either A or−A. The boundary
clustering is due to the hard boundaries of the beliefs as well as the negative updates (ironically the
larger the better), whose mechanism is fundamentally different with the opinion clustering phenomena
resulted from missing of connectivity in Krause types of models Krause (1997), Blondel et al. (2009,
2010), Li et al. (2013), or nonlinear bias in the opinion evolution Dandekar et al. (2013).
Remark 3 Note that in the considered asymmetric and constrained belief evolution, we take symmetric
belief boundaries [−A,A] just for simplifying the discussion. Theorems 4 and 5 continue to hold if the
belief boundaries are chosen to be [A,B] for arbitrary −∞ < A < B < ∞ 1. Letting A = 0, B = 1, our
boundary clustering results in Theorems 4 and 5 are then formally consistent with the belief polarization
result, Theorem 3, in Dandekar et al. (2013). It is worth mentioning that Theorem 3 in Dandekar et al.
(2013) relies on a type of strong balance (the two-island assumption) and that the initial beliefs should
be separated, while Theorems 4 and 5 hold for almost arbitrary initial values.
The proof of Theorems 4 and 5 is obtained by establishing the almost sure happening of suitable
separation events, i.e., the node beliefs for a subnetwork become group polarized (either larger or smaller
than the remaining nodes’ beliefs). From the analysis it is clear that such events tend to happen more
easily for small subnetworks in the partition of (strongly or weakly) balanced social networks. On the
other hand, boundary belief clustering follows quickly after the separation event, even in the presence of
large subgroups. For a large subgroup, the boundary clustering to a consensus for its members is more a
consequence of the “push” by the already separated small subgroups, rather than the trustful interactions
therein. This means, relatively small subgroups contribute to faster occurrence of the clustering of the
entire social network beliefs. Therefore, these results are in strong consistency with the research of
minority influence in social psychology Nemeth (1986), Clark and Maass (1990), which suggests that
consistent minorities can substantially modify people’s private attitudes and opinions.
1This further confirms that, in our model, the origin of the belief space has no special meaning at all, in contrast to the
model of Altafini (2013).
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5.2 When Balance is Missing
Since the boundary constraint only restricts the negative update, similar to Theorem 3, for sufficiently
small β, almost sure state consensus can be guaranteed when the positive graph Gpst is connected.
In absence of any balance property for the underlying graph, belief clustering may not happen. How-
ever, we can establish that when the positive graph is connected, then clustering cannot be achieved
when β is large enough. In fact, the belief of a given node touches the two boundaries −A and A an
infinite number of times. Note that if the positive graph is connected, then the graph cannot be balanced.
Theorem 6 Assume that the positive graph Gpst is connected. For any α ∈ (0, 1) \ {1/2}, when β is
sufficiently large, for almost all initial beliefs, under (19), we have: for all i ∈ V,
P
(
lim inf
k→∞
xi(k) = −A, lim sup
k→∞
xi(k) = A
)
= 1. (24)
Theorem 6 suggests a new class of collective formation for the social beliefs beyond consensus, dis-
agreement, or clustering studied in the literature.
Remark 4 The condition that β being sufficiently large in Theorems 4 and 5 is just a technical assump-
tion ensuring almost sure boundary clustering. Practically one can often encounter such clustering even
for a small β, as illustrated in the coming numerical examples. On the other hand, Theorem 6 relies
crucially on a large β, while a small β leads to belief consensus even in the presence of the negative
edges.
5.3 Numerical Examples
We now provide a few numerical examples to illustrate the results established in this section. We take
A = 1 so that the node beliefs are restricted to the interval [−1, 1]. We take α = 1/3 for the positive
dynamics and a = b = c = 1/3 for the random asymmetric updates. The pair selection process is given
by that when a node i is drawn, it will choose one of its neighbors with equal probability 1/deg(i), where
deg(i) is the degree of node i in the underlying graph G.
First of all we select two social graphs, one is strongly balanced and the other is weakly balanced, as
shown in Figure 3. We take β = 0.2 and randomly select the nodes’ initial values. It is observed that
the boundary clustering phenomena established in Theorems 4 and 5 practically show up in every run
of the random belief updates. We plot one of their typical sample paths in Figure 4, respectively, for
the strongly balanced and weakly balanced graphs in Figure 3. In fact one can see that the clustering is
achieved in around 300 steps.
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Figure 3: Strongly balanced (left) and weakly balanced (right) social graphs. The negative links are
shadowed. Nodes within the same subgraph in the balance partition are marked with the same color.
Figure 4: The evolution of beliefs for strongly balanced (left) and weakly balanced (right) graphs. The
beliefs of nodes within the same subgraph in the balance partition are marked with the same color.
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Figure 5: A social network which is neither strongly nor weakly balanced. The negative links are dashed.
Figure 6: The social network beliefs tend to a consensus with β = 0.2.
Next, we select a social graph which is neither strongly nor weakly balanced, as in Figure 5. In Figure
6, we plot one of the typical sample paths of the random belief evolution with β = 0.2, where clearly
belief consensus is achieved. In Figure 7, we plot one of the typical sample paths of the random belief
evolution for a selected node with β = 7, where the node belief alternatively touches the two boundaries
−1 and 1 in the plotted 5000 steps.
These numerical results are consistent with the results in Theorems 4, 5, and 6.
6 Conclusions
The evolution of opinions over signed social networks was studied. Each link marking interpersonal inter-
action in the network was associated with a sign indicating friend or enemy relations. The dynamics of
opinions were defined along positive and negative links, respectively. We have presented a comprehensive
analysis to the belief convergence and divergence under various modes: in expectation, in mean-square,
and almost surely. Phase transitions were established with sharp thresholds for the mean and mean-
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Figure 7: The belief oscillation for a particular node with β = 7.
square convergence. In the almost sure sense, some surprising results were presented. When opinions
have hard lower and upper bounds with asymmetric updates, the classical structure balance properties
were shown to play a key role in the belief clustering. We believe that these results have largely extended
our understanding to how trustful and antagonistic relations shape social opinions.
Some interesting directions for future research include the following topics. Intuitively there is some
natural coupling between the structure dynamics and the opinion evolution for signed networks. How this
coupling determines the formation of the social structure is an interesting question bridging the studies
on the dynamics of signed graphs (e.g., Marvel et al. (2011)) and the opinion dynamics on signed social
networks (e.g., Altafini (2012, 2013)). It will also be interesting to ask what might be a proper model,
and what the role of structure balance is, for Bayesian opinion evolution on signed social networks (e.g.,
Bikhchandani et al. (1992)).
Appendix: Proofs of Statements
A. The Triangle Lemma
We establish a key technical lemma on the relative beliefs of three nodes in the network in the presence
of at least one link among the three nodes. Denote Jab(k) := |xa(k)− xb(k)| for a, b ∈ V and k ≥ 0.
Lemma 2 Let i0, i1, i2 be three different nodes in V. Suppose {i0, i1} ∈ E. There exist a positive number
δ > 0 and an integer Z > 0, such that
(i) there is a sequence of Z successive node pairs leading to Ji1i2(Z) ≥ δJi0i1(0);
(ii) there is a sequence of Z successive node pairs leading to Ji1i2(Z) ≥ δJi0i2(0).
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Here δ and Z are absolute constants in the sense that they do not depend on i0, i1, i2, nor on the values
held at these nodes.
Proof. We assume n ≥ 5. Generality is not lost by making this assumption because for n = 3 and n = 4,
some (tedious but straightforward) analysis on each possible G leads to the desired conclusion.
(i). There are two cases: {i0, i1} ∈ Epst, or {i0, i1} ∈ Eneg. We prove the desired conclusion for each of
the two cases. Without loss of generality, we assume that xi0(0) < xi1(0).
• Let {i0, i1} ∈ Epst. If xi2(0) ∈
[
3
4xi0(0)+
1
4xi1(0),
1
4xi0(0)+
3
4xi1(0)
]
, we have Ji1i2(0) ≥
1
4Ji0i1(0). Thus, the desired conclusion holds for δ =
1
4 , arbitrary Z > 0, and any node
pair sequence over 0, 1, . . . , Z − 1 for which i0, i1, i2 are never selected.
On the other hand suppose xi2(0) /∈
[
3
4xi0(0) +
1
4xi1(0),
1
4xi0(0) +
3
4xi1(0)
]
. Take
d∗ =

dlog|1−2α| 14e if α 6= 12 ,
1, if α = 12 .
(25)
If {i0, i1} is selected for 0, 1, . . . , d∗ − 1, we obtain Ji0i1(d∗) ≤ 14Ji0i1(0) which leads to
xi1(d∗) ∈
[5
8
xi0(0) +
2
8
xi1(0),
3
8
xi0(0) +
5
8
xi1(0)
]
; xi2(d∗) = xi2(0).
This gives us Ji1i2(d∗) ≥ 18Ji0i1(0).
• Let {i0, i1} ∈ Eneg. If xi2(0) /∈
[
1
2xi0(0)+
1
2xi1(0),−12xi0(0)+ 32xi1(0)
]
, we have Ji1i2(0) ≥
1
2Ji0i1(0). The conclusion holds for δ =
1
2 , arbitrary Z > 0, and any node pair sequence
over 0, 1, . . . , Z − 1 for which i0, i1, i2 are never selected.
On the other hand let xi2(0) ∈
[
1
2xi0(0) +
1
2xi1(0),−12xi0(0) + 32xi1(0)
]
. Take d∗ =
dlog1+2β 4e. Let {i0, i1} be selected for 0, 1, . . . , d∗ − 1. In this case, xi0(s) and xi1(s)
are symmetric with respect to their center 12xi0(0) +
1
2xi1(0) for all s = 0, . . . , d
∗, and
Ji0i1(d∗) ≥ 4Ji0i1(0). Thus we have xi2(d∗) = xi2(0), and
xi1(d
∗) ≥ 1
2
xi0(0) +
1
2
xi1(0) + 2(xi1(0)− xi0(0))
= −3
2
xi0(0) +
5
2
xi1(0). (26)
We can therefore conclude that Ji1i2(d
∗) ≥ Ji0i1(0).
In summary, the desired conclusion holds for δ = 18 and
Z =

max{dlog1+2β 4e, dlog|1−2α| 14e} if α 6= 12
dlog1+2β 4e, if α = 12 .
(27)
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(ii). We distinguish the cases {i0, i1} ∈ Epst and {i0, i1} ∈ Eneg. Without loss of generality, we assume
that xi0(0) < xi2(0).
• Let {i0, i1} ∈ Epst. If xi1(0) /∈
[
1
2xi0(0) +
1
2xi2(0),−12xi0(0) + 32xi2(0)
]
, we have
Ji1i2(0) ≥ 12Ji0i2(0). The conclusion holds for δ = 12 , arbitrary Z > 0, and any node pair
sequence 0, 1, . . . , Z − 1 for which i0, i1, i2 are never selected.
Now let xi1(0) ∈
[
1
2xi0(0)+
1
2xi2(0),−12xi0(0)+ 32xi2(0)
]
. We write xi1(0) = (1−ς)xi0(0)+
ςxi2(0) with ς ∈ [12 , 32 ]. Let {i0, i1} be the node pair selected for 0, 1, . . . , d∗ − 1 with
d∗ defined by (25). Note that according to the structure of the update rule, xi0(s) and
xi1(s) will be symmetric with respect to their center (1 − ς2)xi0(0) + ς2xi2(0) for all
s = 0, . . . , d∗, and Ji0i1(d∗) ≤ 14Ji0i1(0). This gives us xi2(d∗) = xi2(0) and
xi1(d∗) ∈
[
(1− ς
2
)xi0(0) +
ς
2
xi2(0)−
1
8
(xi1(0)− xi0(0)),
(1− ς
2
)xi0(0) +
ς
2
xi2(0) +
1
8
(xi1(0)− xi0(0))
]
=
[
(1− 3ς
8
)xi0(0) +
3ς
8
xi2(0), (1−
5ς
8
)xi0(0) +
5ς
8
xi2(0)
]
, (28)
which implies
Ji1i2(d∗) ≥ (1−
5ς
8
)Ji0i2(0) ≥
1
16
Ji0i2(0). (29)
• Let {i0, i1} ∈ Eneg. If xi1(0) /∈
[
1
2xi0(0) +
1
2xi2(0),−12xi0(0) + 32xi2(0)
]
, the conclusion
holds for the same reason as in the case where {i0, i1} ∈ Epst.
Now let xi1(0) ∈
[
1
2xi0(0)+
1
2xi2(0),−12xi0(0)+ 32xi2(0)
]
. We continue to use the notation
xi1(0) = (1− ς)xi0(0) + ςxi2(0) with ς ∈ [12 , 32 ]. Let {i0, i1} be the node pair selected for
0, 1, . . . , d∗−1 where d∗ = dlog1+2β 4e. In this case, xi0(s) and xi1(s) are still symmetric
with respect to their center (1− ς2)xi0(0)+ ς2xi2(0) for all s = 0, 1, . . . , d∗, and Ji0i1(d∗) ≥
4Ji0i1(0). This gives us xi2(d∗) = xi2(0) and
xi1(d∗) ≥ (1−
ς
2
)xi0(0) +
ς
2
xi2(0) + 2(xi1(0)− xi0(0))
= (1− 5ς
2
)xi0(0) +
5ς
2
xi2(0) (30)
which implies
Ji1i2(d∗) ≥ (
5ς
2
− 1)Ji0i2(0) ≥
1
4
Ji0i2(0). (31)
In summary, the desired conclusion holds for δ = 116 with Z defined in (27).
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B. Proof of Theorem 1
Introduce
Xmin(k) = min
i∈V
xi(k); Xmax(k) = max
i∈V
xi(k).
We define X(k) = Xmax(k)−Xmin(k). Suppose belief divergence is achieved almost surely. Take a constant
N0 such that N0 > X(0). Then almost surely,
K1 := inf
k
{X(k) ≥ N0}
is a finite number. Then K1 is a stopping time for the node pair selection process Gk, k = 0, 1, 2, . . . since
{K1 = k} ∈ σ(G0, . . . , Gk−1)
for all k = 1, 2, . . . due to the fact that X(k) is, indeed, a function of G0, . . . , Gk−1. Strong Markov Prop-
erty leads to: GK1 , GK1+1, . . . are independent of FK1−1, and they are i.i.d. with the same distribution
as G0 (e.g., Theorem 4.1.3 in Durrett (2010)).
Now take two different (deterministic) nodes i0 and j0. Since X(K1) ≥ N0, there must be two different
(random) nodes i∗ and j∗ satisfying xi∗(K1) < xj∗(K1) with Ji∗j∗(K1) ≥ N0. We make the following
claim.
Claim. There exist a positive number δ0 > 0 and an integer Z0 > 0 (δ0 and Z0 are deterministic
constants) such that we can always select a sequence of node pairs for time steps K1,K1 + 1,K1 +Z0−1
which guarantees Ji0j0(K1 + Z0) ≥ δ0N0.
First of all note that i∗ and j∗ are independent with GK1 , GK1+1, . . . , since i∗, j∗ ∈ FK1−1. Therefore,
we can treat i∗ and j∗ as deterministic and prove the claim for all choices of such i∗ and j∗ (because we
can always carry out the analysis conditioned on different events {i∗ = i, j∗ = j}, i, j ∈ V). We proceed
the proof recursively taking advantage of the Triangle Lemma.
Suppose {i0, j0} = {i∗, j∗}, the claim holds trivially. Now suppose i0 /∈ {i∗, j∗}. Either Ji0i∗(K1) ≥ N02
or Ji0j∗(K1) ≥ N02 must hold. Without loss of generality we assume Ji0i∗(K1) ≥ N02 . Since G is connected,
there is a path i0i1 . . . iτ j0 in G with τ ≤ n− 2.
Based on Lemma 2, there exist δ > 0 and integer Z > 0 such that a selection of node pair sequence
for K1,K1 + 1, . . . ,K1 + Z − 1 leads to
Ji0i1(K1 + Z) ≥ δJi0i∗(K1) ≥
δN0
2
since {i0, i1} ∈ E. Applying recursively the Triangle Lemma based on the fact that {i1, i2}, . . . , {iτ , j0} ∈
E, we see that a selection of node pair sequence for K1,K1 + 1, . . . ,K1 + (τ + 1)Z − 1 will give us
Ji0j0(K1 + (τ + 1)Z) ≥ δτ+1Ji0i∗(K1) ≥
δτ+1N0
2
.
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Since τ ≤ n− 2, the claim always holds for δ0 = δn−12 and Z0 = (n− 1)Z, independently of i∗ and j∗.
Therefore, denoting p∗ = min{pij + pji : {i, j} ∈ E}, the claim we just proved yields that
P
(
Ji0j0(K1 + (n− 1)Z) ≥
δn−1N0
2
)
≥
(p∗
n
)(n−1)Z
. (32)
We proceed the analysis by recursively defining
Km+1 := inf
{
k ≥ Km + Z0 : X(k) ≥ N0
}
, m = 1, 2, . . . .
Given that belief divergence is achieved, Km is finite for all m ≥ 1 almost surely. Thus,
P
(
Ji0j0(Km + Z0) ≥
δn−1N0
2
)
≥
(p∗
n
)Z0
, (33)
for all m = 1, 2, . . . . Moreover, the node pair sequence
GK1 , . . . , GK1+Z0−1; . . . . . . ;GKm , . . . , GKm+Z0−1; . . . . . .
are independent and have the same distribution as G0 (This is due to that FK1 ⊆ FK1+1 ⊆ · · · ⊆
FK1+Z0−1 ⊆ FK2 . . . . (cf. Theorem 4.1.4 in Durrett (2010))).
Therefore, we can finally invoke the second Borel-Cantelli Lemma (cf. Theorem 2.3.6 in Durrett
(2010)) to conclude that almost surely, there exists an infinite subsequence Kms , s = 1, 2, . . . , satisfying
Ji0j0(Kms + Z0) ≥
δn−1N0
2
, s = 1, 2, . . . , (34)
conditioned on that belief divergence is achieved. Since δ is a constant and N0 is arbitrarily chosen, (34)
is equivalent to P
(
lim supk→∞
∣∣xi0(k)− xj0(k)∣∣ =∞) = 1, which completes the proof.
C. Proof of Lemma 1
(i). It suffices to show that P
(
lim supk→∞X(k) ∈ [a∗, b∗]
)
= 0 for all 0 < a∗ < b∗. We prove the statement
by contradiction. Suppose P
(
lim supk→∞X(k) ∈ [a∗, b∗]
)
= p > 0 for some 0 < a∗ < b∗.
Take 0 < ε < 1 and define a = a∗(1− ε), b = b∗(1 + ε). We introduce
T1 := inf
k
{X(k) ∈ [a, b]}.
Then T1 is finite with probability at least p. T1 is a stopping time. GT1 , GT1+1, . . . are independent of
FT1−1, and they are i.i.d. with the same distribution as G0.
Now since Gneg is nonempty, we take a link {i?, j?} ∈ Eneg. Repeating the same analysis as the proof
of Theorem 1, the following statement holds true conditioned on that T1 is finite: there exist a positive
number δ0 > 0 and an integer Z0 > 0 (δ0 and Z0 are deterministic constants) such that we can always
select a sequence of node pairs for time steps T1, T1+1, T1+Z0−1 which guarantees Ji?j?(T1+Z0) ≥ δ0a.
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Here δ0 and Z0 follow from the same definition in the proof of Theorem 1. Take
m0 =
⌈
log2β+1
2b
δ0a
⌉
and let {i?, j?} be selected for T1 +Z0, . . . , T1 +Z0 +m0− 1. Then noting that {i?, j?} ∈ Eneg, the choice
of m0 and the fact that Ji?j?(s+ 1) = (2β + 1)Ji?j?(s), s = T1 + Z0, . . . , T1 + Z0 +m0 − 1 lead to
X(T1 + Z0 +m0) ≥ Ji?j?(T1 + Z0 +m0) ≥ (2β + 1)m0δ0a ≥ 2b ≥ 2b∗.
We have proved that
P
(
X(T1 + Z0 +m0) ≥ 2b∗
∣∣∣T1 <∞) ≥ (p∗
n
)Z0+m0
. (35)
Similarly, we proceed the analysis by recursively defining
Tm+1 := inf
{
k ≥ Tm + Z0 +m0 : X(k) ∈ [a, b]
}
, m = 1, 2, . . . .
Given P
(
lim supk→∞X(k) ∈ [a∗, b∗]
)
= p, Tm is finite for all m ≥ 1 with probability at least p. Thus,
there holds
P
(
X(Tm + Z0 +m0) ≥ 2b∗
∣∣∣Tm <∞) ≥ (p∗
n
)Z0+m0
, m = 1, 2, . . . . (36)
The independence of
GT1 , . . . , GT1+Z0+m0−1; . . . . . . ;GTm , . . . , GTm+Z0+m0−1; . . . . . .
once again allows us to invoke the Borel-Cantelli Lemma to conclude that almost surely, there exists an
infinite subsequence Tms , s = 1, 2, . . . , satisfying
X(Tms + Z0 +m0) ≥ 2b∗, s = 1, 2, . . . , (37)
given that Tm,m = 1, 2 . . . , are finite. In other words, we have obtained that
P
(
lim sup
k→∞
X(k) ≥ 2b∗
∣∣∣ lim sup
k→∞
X(k) ∈ [a∗, b∗]
)
= 1, (38)
which is impossible and the first part of the theorem has been proved.
(ii). It suffices to show that P
(
lim infk→∞X(k) ∈ [a∗, b∗]
)
= 0 for all 0 < a∗ < b∗. The proof is again by
contradiction. Assume that P
(
lim infk→∞X(k) ∈ [a∗, b∗]
)
= q > 0. Let a, b, and T1 := infk{X(k) ∈ [a, b]}
as defined earlier. T1 is finite with probability at least q.
Let `0 ∈ V satisfying x`0(T1) = Xmin(T1). There is a path from `0 to every other node in the network
since Gpst is connected. We introduce
V†t := {j : d(`0, j) = t in Gpst}, t = 0, . . . ,diam(Gpst)
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as a partition of V. We relabel the nodes in V \ {`0} in the following manner.
`s ∈ V†1, s = 1, . . . , |V†1|;
`s ∈ V†2, s = |V†1|+ 1, . . . , |V†1|+ |V†2|;
. . . . . .
`s ∈ V†diam(Gpst), s =
diam(Gpst)−1∑
t=1
|V†t |, . . . , n− 1.
Then the definition of V†t and the connectivity of Gpst allow us to select a sequence of node pairs in the
form of
GT1+s = {`ρ, `s+1}, {`ρ, `s+1} ∈ Epst with ρ ≤ s,
for s = 0, . . . , n− 2. Next we give an estimation for X under the selected sequence of node pairs.
• Since {`0, `1} is selected at time T1, we have
x`0(T1 + 1) = (1− α)x`0(T1) + αx`1(T1) ≤ (1− α)Xmin(T1) + αXmax(T1);
x`1(T1 + 1) = (1− α)x`1(T1) + αx`0(T1) ≤ (1− α)Xmax(T1) + αXmin(T1). (39)
This leads to x`s(T1 + 1) ≤ (1 − α∗)Xmin(T1) + α∗Xmax(T1), s = 0, 1, where α∗ =
max{α, 1− α}.
• Note that Xmax(T1 + 1) = Xmax(T1), and that either {`0, `2} or {`1, `2} is selected at
time T1 + 1. We deduce:
x`s(T1 + 2) ≤ (1− α)
[
(1− α∗)Xmin(T1) + α∗Xmax(T1)
]
+ αXmax(T1)
≤ (1− α∗)2Xmin(T1) +
(
1− (1− α∗)2
)
Xmax(T1), s = 0, 1;
x`2(T1 + 2) ≤ α[(1− α∗)Xmin(T1) + α∗Xmax(T1)] + (1− α)Xmax(T1)
≤ (1− α∗)2Xmin(T1) +
(
1− (1− α∗)2
)
Xmax(T1), (40)
Thus we obtain x`s(T1 + 2) ≤ (1− α∗)2Xmin(T1) +
(
1− (1− α∗)2
)
Xmax(T1), s = 0, 1, 2.
• We carry on the analysis recursively, and finally get:
x`s(T1 + n− 1) ≤ (1− α∗)n−1Xmin(T1) +
(
1− (1− α∗)n−1
)
Xmax(T1),
for s = 0, 1, 2, . . . , n− 1. Equivalently:
Xmax(T1 + n− 1) ≤ (1− α∗)n−1Xmin(T1) +
(
1− (1− α∗)n−1
)
Xmax(T1). (41)
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We conclude that:
X(T1 + n− 1) = Xmax(T1 + n− 1)−Xmin(T1 + n− 1)
= Xmax(T1 + n− 1)−Xmin(T1)
≤ r0X(T1), (42)
where r0 = 1− (1− α∗)n−1 is a constant in (0, 1).
With the above analysis taking
L0 =
⌈
logr0
a
2b
⌉
,
and selecting the given pair sequence periodically for L0 rounds, we obtain
X(T1 + (n− 1)L0) ≤ rL00 X(T1) ≤
a
2b
· b = a
2
<
a∗
2
. (43)
In light of (43) and the selection of the node pair sequence, we have obtained that
P
(
X(T1 + (n− 1)L0) ≤ a∗
2
)
≥
(p∗
n
)(n−1)L0
(44)
given that T1 is finite. We repeat the above argument for Tm+1, m = 2, 3 . . . . Borel-Cantelli Lemma then
implies
P
(
lim inf
k→∞
X(k) ≤ a∗
2
∣∣∣ lim inf
k→∞
X(k) ∈ [a∗, b∗]
)
= 1, (45)
which is impossible and completes the proof.
D. Proof of Theorem 2
Let ω /∈ C . Then there exists an initial value x0 ∈ Rn from which
lim sup
k→∞
X(k)(ω) > 0. (46)
According to Lemma 1, (46) implies that
P
(
lim sup
k→∞
X(k) =∞
∣∣∣C c) = P(D∣∣C c) = 1, (47)
which implies P(C ) + P(D) = 1.
With P(C ) + P(D) = 1, D is a trivial event as long as C is a trivial event. Therefore, for completing
the proof we just need to verify that C is a trivial event.
We first show that C =
{
limk→∞Wk . . .W0 = U
}
. In fact, if lim supk→∞maxi,j |xi(k) − xj(k)| = 0
under x0 ∈ Rn, then we have limk→∞ x(k) = 1n11′x0 because the sum of the beliefs is preserved.
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Therefore, we can restrict the analysis to x0 = ei, i = 1, . . . , n and on can readily see that C ={
limk→∞Wk . . .W0 = U
}
.
Next, we apply the argument, which was originally introduced in Tahbaz-Salehi and Jadbabaie
(2008) for establishing the weak ergodicity of product of random stochastic matrices with positive di-
agonal terms, to conclude that C is a trivial event. A more general treatment to zero-one laws of
random averaging algorithms can be found in Touri and Nedic´ (2011). Define a sequence of event
Cs =
{
limk→∞Wk . . .Ws = U
}
for s = 1, 2, . . . . We see that
• P(Cs) = P(C ) for all s = 1, 2, . . . since Wk, k = 0, 1, . . . , are i.i.d.
• Cs+1 ⊆ Cs for all s = 1, 2, . . . since limk→∞Wk . . .Ws+1 = U implies limk→∞Wk . . .Ws = U due
to the fact that UWs ≡ U .
Therefore, we have
⋂∞
s=1 Cs is a tail event within the tail σ-field
⋂∞
s=1 σ(Gs, Gs+1, . . . ). By Kolmogorov’s
zero-one law,
⋂∞
s=1 Cs is a trivial event. Hence P(C ) = lims→∞ P(Cs) = P(
⋂∞
s=1 Cs) is a trivial event,
and the desired conclusion follows.
E. Proof of Theorem 3
Theorem 3 is a direct consequence of the following lemmas.
Lemma 3 Suppose Gpst is connected. Then for every fixed α ∈ (0, 1), we have P(C ) = 1 for all 0 ≤ β <
β\ with
β\ := sup
{
β : β(1 + β) <
λ2(L
†
pst)
λmax(L
†
neg)
α(1− α)
}
.
Proof. Let xave =
∑
i∈V xi(0)/n be the average of the initial beliefs. We introduce V (k) =
∑n
i=1 |xi(k)−
xave|2 =
∣∣(I − U)x(k)∣∣2. The evolution of V (k) follows from
E
{
V (k + 1)
∣∣∣x(k)} = E{x(k + 1)′(I − U)2x(k + 1)∣∣∣x(k)}
a)
= E
{
x(k)′W (k)(I − U)W (k)x(k)
∣∣∣x(k)}
b)
= E
{
x(k)′(I − U)[W (k)(I − U)W (k)](I − U)x(k)∣∣∣x(k)}
c)
≤ λmax
(
E{W (k)(I − U)W (k)})∣∣(I − U)x(k)∣∣2
d)
= λmax
(
E{W 2(k)} − U)V (k), (48)
where a) is based on the facts that W (k) is symmetric and the simple fact (I − U)2 = I − U , b) holds
because (I−U)W (k) = W (k)(I−U) always holds and again (I−U)2 = I−U , c) follows from Rayleigh-
Ritz theorem (cf. Theorem 4.2.2 in Horn and Johnson (1985)) and the fact that W (k) is independent
of x(k), d) is based on simple algebra and W (k)U = UW (k) = U .
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We now compute E(W 2(k)). Note that
(
I − α(ei − ej)(ei − ej)′
)2
= I − 2α(1− α)(ei − ej)(ei − ej)′;(
I + β(ei − ej)(ei − ej)′
)2
= I + 2β(1− β)(ei − ej)(ei − ej)′. (49)
This observation combined with (5) leads to
P
(
W 2(k) = I − 2α(1− α)(ei − ej)(ei − ej)′
)
=
pij + pji
n
, {i, j} ∈ Epst;
P
(
W 2(k) = I + 2β(1 + β)(ei − ej)(ei − ej)′
)
=
pij + pji
n
, {i, j} ∈ Eneg.
As a result, we have
E{W 2(k)} = I − 2α(1− α)L†pst + 2β(1 + β)L†neg. (50)
Consequently, we have 0 < γ := λmax
(
E(W 2(k))− U) < 1 for all β satisfying
β(1 + β) <
λ2(L
†
pst)
λmax(L
†
neg)
α(1− α). (51)
Since g(β) = β(1 + β) is nondecreasing, we conclude from (48) that
E
{
V (k + 1)
∣∣x(k)} < γV (k) (52)
with 0 < γ < 1 for all 0 ≤ β < β\. This means that V (k) is a supermartingale as long as 0 ≤ γ ≤ 1
Durrett (2010), and V (k) converges to a limit almost surely by the martingale convergence theorem
(Theorem 5.2.9, Durrett (2010)). Next we show that this limit is zero almost surely if 0 ≤ γ < 1. Let
 > 0 and 0 ≤ γ < 1. We have:
P
(
V (k) >  infinitely often
)
a)
= P
( ∞∑
k=0
P
(
V (k + 1) > 
∣∣x(k)) =∞)
b)
≤ P
(1

∞∑
k=0
E
{
V (k + 1)
∣∣x(k)} =∞)
c)
≤ P
(γ

∞∑
k=1
V (k) =∞
)
, (53)
where a) is straightforward application of the Second Borel-Cantelli Lemma (Theorem 5.3.2. in Durrett
(2010)), b) is from the Markov’s inequality, and c) holds directly from (52). Observing that
∞∑
k=1
E{V (k)} ≤
∞∑
k=1
γkV (0) ≤ γ
1− γ V (0) <∞, (54)
we obtain P
(γ

∑∞
k=1 V (k) = ∞
)
= 0. Therefore, we have proved that P
(
V (k) >  infinitely often
)
= 0,
or equivalently, P(limk→∞ V (k) = 0) = 1.
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Finally, observe that:
V (k) =
n∑
i=1
|xi(k)− xave|2 ≥ |xρ1(k)− xave|2 + |xρ2(k)− xave|2 ≥
1
2
|xρ1(k)− xρ2(k)|2 =
1
2
X2(k),
where ρ1 and ρ2 are chosen such that xρ1(k) = Xmin(k), xρ2(k) = Xmax(k). Hence P(limk→∞ V (k) =
0) = 1 implies P(limk→∞X(k) = 0) = 1. This completes the proof. 
Remark 5 We have shown that:
E
{
V (k + 1)
} ≤ λmax(E{W 2(k)} − U)E{V (k)} (55)
from (48). A symmetric analysis leads to:
E
{
V (k + 1)
} ≥ λmin(E{W 2(k)} − U)E{V (k)}. (56)
Proposition 3 readily follows from these inequalities.
Lemma 4 Suppose α ∈ [0, 1] with α 6= 1/2. There exists a constant β] > 0 such that
P(lim inf
k→∞
max
i,j
|xi(k)− xj(k)| =∞) = 1
for almost all initial beliefs when β > β].
Proof. Suppose X(0) > 0. We have:
Jij(k + 1) =

|2α− 1|Jij(k), if Gk = {i, j} ∈ Epst
|2β + 1|Jij(k), if Gk = {i, j} ∈ Eneg.
(57)
Thus, X(k) > 0 almost surely for all k as long as X(0) > 0. As a result, the following sequence of random
variables is well defined:
ζk =
X(k + 1)
X(k)
, k = 0, 1, . . . . (58)
The proof is based on the analysis of ζk. We proceed in three steps.
Step 1. In this step, we establish some natural upper and lower bounds for ζk. First of all, from (57), it
is easy to see that:
P
(
ζk =
X(k + 1)
X(k)
≥ |2α− 1|
)
= 1 (59)
and P
(
ζk < 1
) ≤ P(one link in Epst is selected).
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On the other hand let {i0, j0} ∈ Gneg. Suppose i? and j? are two nodes satisfying Ji?j? = X(0).
Repeating the analysis in the proof of Theorem 1 by recursively applying the Triangle Lemma, we
conclude that there is a sequence of node pairs for time steps 0, 1, . . . , (n− 1)Z − 1 which guarantees
Ji0j0((n− 1)Z) ≥
δn−1
2
X(0) (60)
where δ = 1/16 and Z = max{dlog1+2β 4e, dlog|1−2α| 14e} are defined in the Triangle Lemma. For the
remaining of the proof we assume that β is sufficiently large so that dlog1+2β 4e ≤ dlog|1−2α| 14e, which
means that we can select Z = dlog|1−2α| 14e independently of β.
Now take an integer H0 ≥ 1. Continuing the previous node pair sequence, let {i0, j0} be selected at
time steps (n− 1)Z, . . . , (n− 1)Z +H0 − 1. It then follows from (57) and (60) that
X((n− 1)Z +H0) ≥ Ji0j0((n− 1)Z +H0) ≥
(2β + 1)H0δn−1
2
X(0). (61)
Denote ZH0 = (n − 1)Z + H0. This node sequence for 0, 1, . . . , ZH0 , which leads to (61), is denoted
Si0j0([0, ZH0)).
Step 2. We now define a random variable QZH0 (0), associated with the node pair selection process in
steps 0, . . . , ZH0 − 1, by
QZH0 (0) =

|2α− 1|ZH0 , if at least one link in Epst is selected in steps 0, 1, . . . , ZH0 − 1;
(2β+1)H0δn−1
2 , if node sequence Si0j0([0, ZH0)) is selected in steps 0, 1, . . . , ZH0 − 1;
1, otherwise.
(62)
In view of (59) and (61), we have:
P
( ZH0−1∏
k=0
ζk =
X(ZH0)
X(0)
≥ QZH0 (0)
)
= 1. (63)
From direct calculation based on the definition of QZH0 (0), we conclude that
E
{
logQZH0 (0)
}
≥
(p∗
n
)ZH0
log
(2β + 1)H0δn−1
2
+
(
1− (1− p∗
n
)E0ZH0
)
log |2α− 1|ZH0
:= CH0 (64)
where p∗ = max{pij + pji : {i, j} ∈ E} and E0 = |Epst| denotes the number of positive links. Since Z
does not depend on β, we see from (64) that for any fixed H0, there is a constant β
♦(H0) > 0 with
dlog1+2β♦ 4e ≤ dlog|1−2α| 14e guaranteeing that
β > β♦(H0)⇒ CH0 > 0.
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Step 3. Recursively applying the analysis in the previous steps, node pair sequences Si0j0([sZH0 , (s +
1)ZH0)) can be found for s = 1, 2, . . . , and QZH0 (s), s = 1, 2, . . . can be defined associated with the node
pair selection process (following the same definition of QZH0 (0)). Since the node pair selection process
is independent of time and node states, QZH0 (s), s = 0, 1, 2, . . . , are independent random variables (not
necessarily i.i.d since Si0j0([sZH0 , (s + 1)ZH0)) may correspond to different pair sequences for different
s.) The lower bound established in (64) holds for all s, i.e.,
E
{
logQZH0 (s)
} ≥ CH0 , s = 0, 1, . . . . (65)
Moreover, we can prove as (63) was established that:
P
( tZH0−1∏
k=0
ζk =
X(tZH0)
X(0)
≥
t−1∏
s=0
QZH0 (s), t = 0, 1, 2, . . .
)
= 1. (66)
It is straightforward to see that V
{
logQZH0 (s)
}
, s = 0, 1, . . . is bounded uniformly in s. Kolmogorov’s
strong law of large numbers (for a sequence of mutually independent random variables under Kolmogorov
criterion, see Feller (1968)) implies that:
P
(
lim
t→∞
1
t
t∑
s=0
(
logQZH0 (s)− E
{
logQZH0 (s)
})
= 0
)
= 1. (67)
Using (65), (67) further implies that:
P
(
lim inf
t→∞
1
t
t∑
s=0
logQZH0 (s) ≥ CH0
)
= 1. (68)
The final part of the proof is based on (66). With the definition of ζk, (66) yields:
P
(
logX
(
(t+ 1)ZH0
)− logX(0) = (t+1)ZH0−1∑
k=0
log ζk ≥
t∑
s=0
logQZH0 (s), t = 0, 1, 2, . . .
)
= 1,
which together with (68) gives us:
P
(
lim inf
t→∞ X
(
(t+ 1)ZH0
)
=∞
)
= 1. (69)
We can further conclude that:
P
(
lim inf
k→∞
X
(
k
)
=∞
)
= 1 (70)
since P
(
X
(
k
) ≥ |2α− 1|ZH0X(d kZH0 ⌉ZH0)) = 1 in view of (59).
Therefore, for any integer H0 ≥ 1, we have proved that belief divergence is achieved for all initial
condition satisfying X(0) > 0 if β > β♦(H0). Define
β] := inf
H0≥1
β♦(H0).
With this choice of β], the desired conclusion holds. 
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F. Proof of Proposition 5
Note that there exist {is, js} ∈ Gpst, s = 1, 2, . . . , T with T ≥ 1 such that
W+iT jT · · ·W+i1j1 = U (71)
if and only if for any y(0) = y0 = (y01 . . . y
0
n)
′, the dynamical system
y(k) = W+ikjky(k − 1), k = 1, . . . , T (72)
drives y(k) = (y1(k), . . . , yn(k))
′ to y(T ) = ave(y(0))1 where ave(y(0)) =
∑n
i=1 y
0
i /n. Thus we may study
the matrix equality (71) through individual node dynamics, which we leverage in the proof.
The claim follows from an induction argument. Assume that the desired sequence of node pairs with
length Tk = k2
k−1 exists for m = k. Assume that Gpst has a subgraph isomorphic to an m+1 dimensional
hypercube. Without loss of generality we assume V has been rewritten as {0, 1}k+1 following the definition
of hypercube.
Now define
V†0 := {i1 × · · · × ik+1 ∈ V : ik+1 = 0}; V†1 := {i1 × · · · × ik+1 ∈ V : ik+1 = 1}.
It is easy to see that each of the subgraphs G
V†0
and G
V†1
contains a positive subgraph isomorphic with
an m-dimensional hypercube. Therefore, for any initial value of y(0), the nodes in each set G
V†s
, s = 0, 1
can reach the same value, say C0(y(0)) and C1(y(0)), respectively. Then we select the following 2k edges
for updates from G:
{i1 × · · · × ik × 0, i1 × · · · × ik × 1} : is ∈ {0, 1}, s = 1, . . . , k.
After these updates, all nodes reach the same value (C0(y(0)) + C1(y(0)))/2 which has to be ave(y(0))
since the sum of the node beliefs is constant during this process. Thus, the desired sequence of node
pairs exists also for m = k + 1, with a length
Tk+1 = 2Tk + 2
k = 2k2k−1 + 2k = (k + 1)2k.
This proves the desired conclusion.
G. Proof of Proposition 6
The requirement of α = 1/2 is obvious since otherwise W+ij is nonsingular for all {i, j} ∈ Epst, while
rankU = 1. The necessity of m = 2k for some k ≥ 0 was proved in Shi et al. (2014) through an elementary
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number theory argument by constructing a particular initial value for which finite-time convergence can
never be possible by pairwise averaging.
It remains to show that Gpst has a perfect matching. Now suppose Eq. (71) holds. Without loss of
generality we assume that Eq. (71) is irreducible in the sense that the equality will no longer hold if
any (one or more) matrices are removed from that sequence. The idea of the proof is to analyze the
dynamical system (72) backwards from the final step. In this way we will recover a perfect matching
from
{{i1, j1}, . . . , {iT , jT }}. We divide the remaining of the proof into three steps.
Step 1. We first establish some property associated with {iT , jT }. After the last step in (72), two nodes
iT and jT reach the same value, ave(y
0), along with all the other nodes. We can consequently write
yiT (T − 1) = ave(y0) + hT (y0), yjT (T − 1) = ave(y0)− hT (y0),
where hT (·) is a real-valued function marking the error between yiT (T − 1), yjT (T − 1) and the true
average ave(y0).
Indeed, the set {y0 : hT (y0) = 0} is explicitly given by{
y0 : (0 . . . 1︸︷︷︸
iT ’th
. . . −1︸︷︷︸
jT ’th
. . . 0)W+iT−1jT−1 · · ·W+i1j1y0 = 0
}
,
which is a linear subspace with dimension n − 1 (recall that the equation W+iT jT . . .W+i1j1 = U is irre-
ducible). Thus there must be hT (y
0) 6= 0 for some initial value y0.
Step 2. If there are only two nodes in the network, we are done. Otherwise {iT−1, jT−1} 6= {iT , jT }. We
make the following claim.
Claim. iT−1, jT−1 /∈ {iT , jT }.
Suppose without loss of generality that iT−1 = iT . Then
yjT−1(T ) = yjT−1(T − 1) = yiT−1(T − 1) = yiT (T − 1) = ave(y0) + hT (y0).
While on the other hand yjT−1(T ) = ave(y
0) for all y0. The claim holds observing that as we just
established, {hT (y0) 6= 0} is a nonempty set.
We then write:
yiT−1(T − 2) = ave(y0) + hT−1(y0), yjT−1(T − 2) = ave(y0)− hT−1(y0)
where hT−1(·) is again a real-valued function and hT−1(y0) 6= 0 for some initial value y0 (applying the
same argument as for hT (y
0) 6= 0). Note that
{
y0 : hT (y
0) 6= 0} ∩ {y0 : hT−1(y0) 6= 0} = ({y0 : hT (y0) = 0} ∪ {y0 : hT−1(y0) = 0})c
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is nonempty because it is the complement of the union of two linear subspaces of dimension n− 1 in Rn.
Step 3. Again, if there are only four nodes in the network, we are done. Otherwise, we can define:
T? := max
{
τ : {iτ , jτ} * {iT−1, jT−1, iT , jT }
}
(73)
We emphasize that T? must exist since Eq. (71) holds. As before, we have iT? , jT? /∈ {iT−1, jT−1, iT , jT }
and hT?(y
0) can be found with {hT?(y0) = 0} being another (n− 1)-dimensional subspace such that
yiT? (T? − 1) = ave(y0) + hT?(y0), yjT? (T? − 1) = ave(y0)− hT?(y0).
We thus conclude that this argument can be proceeded recursively until we have found a perfect
matching of Gpst in
{{i1, j1}, . . . , {iT , jT }}. We have now completed the proof.
H. Proof of Theorem 4
We first state and prove intermediate lemmas that will be useful for the proofs of Theorems 4, 5, and 6.
Lemma 5 Assume that α ∈ (0, 1). Let i1 . . . ik be a path in the positive graph, i.e., {is, is+1} ∈ Gpst, s =
1, . . . , k− 1. Take a node i∗ ∈ {i1, . . . , ik}. Then for any ε > 0, there always exists an integer Z?(ε) ≥ 1,
such that we can select a sequence of node pairs from {is, is+1}, s = 1, . . . , k−1 under asymmetric updates
which guarantees
Ji∗is(Z?) ≤ 2Aε, s ∈ {1, . . . , k}
for all initial condition xis(0), s = 1, . . . , k.
Proof. The proof is easy and an appropriate sequence of node pairs can be built just observing that
Ji∗is ≤ 2A for all s ∈ {1, . . . , k}. 
Lemma 6 Fix α ∈ (0, 1) with α 6= 1/2. Under belief dynamics (19), there exist an integer Z0 ≥ 1 and
a constant ϑ0 > 0 such that
P
(∃{i∗, j∗} ∈ Gneg s.t. Ji∗j∗(Z0) ≥ 12nX(0)) ≥ ϑ0. (74)
Proof. We can always uniquely divide V into m0 ≥ 1 mutually disjoint sets V1, . . . , Vm0 such that
Gpst(Vk), k = 1, . . . ,m0 are connected graphs, where Gpst(Vk) is the induced graph of Gpst by node set
Vk. The idea is to treat each Gpst(Vk) as a super node (an illustration of this partition is shown in Figure
8). Since G is connected and Gneg is nonempty, these super nodes form a connected graph whose edges
are negative.
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Figure 8: There is a unique partition of G into subgraphs following the connected components of Gpst.
Viewing each subgraph as a super node, the graph is connected, and has only negative edges.
One can readily show that there exist two distinct nodes η1, η2 ∈ V with ηi ∈ Vνi , i = 1, 2 (Vν1 and
Vν2 can be the same, of course) such that there is at least one negative edge between Vν1 and Vν2 and
such that:
Jη1η2(0) ≥
1
m0
X(0). (75)
Now select υ1 ∈ Vν1 and υ2 ∈ Vν2 such that {υ1, υ2} ∈ Eneg. In view of Lemma 5 and observing that
asymmetric updates happen with a strictly positive probability, we can always find ϑ0 > 0 and Z0 ≥ 1
(both functions of (α, n, a, b, c)) such that:
P
(
xνi(Z0) = xνi(0), Jυiνi(Z0) ≤
1
4n
X(0), i = 1, 2
)
≥ ϑ0, (76)
(because Gpst(Vνi), i = 1, 2 are connected graphs). (74) follows from (75) and (76) since m0 ≤ n. 
Lemma 7 Fix α ∈ (0, 1) with α 6= 1/2. Under belief dynamics (19), there exists β(α) > 0 such that
P(lim supk→∞X(k) = 2A) = 1 for almost all initial beliefs if β > β.
Proof. In view of Lemma 6, we have:
P
(
X(Z0 + t) ≥ min
{(β + 1)t
2n
X(0), 2A
}) ≥ (cp∗
n
)t
ϑ0, t = 0, 1, . . . . (77)
We can conclude that:
P(lim sup
k→∞
X(k) = 2A) + P(lim sup
k→∞
X(k) = 0) = 1 (78)
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as long as β > 0 using the same argument as that used in the proof of statement (i) in Lemma 1.
With (77), we have:
P
(
X(Z0 + 1) ≥ β + 1
2n
X(0)
) ≥ cp∗
n
ϑ0 (79)
conditioned on X(0) ≤ 4An/(1 + β). Moreover, (59) still holds for belief dynamics (19). Therefore, we
can invoke exactly the same argument as that used in the proof of Lemma 4 to conclude that there exists
β(α) > 0 such that
P
(
lim sup
k→∞
X(k) ≥ 4An/(1 + β)) = 1 (80)
for all β > β(α). Combining (78) and (80), we get the desired result. 
Lemma 8 Assume that the graph is strongly balanced under partition V = V1 ∪ V2, and that GV1 and
GV2 are connected. Let α ∈ (0, 1) \ {1/2}. Fix the initial beliefs x0. Then under belief dynamics (19),
there are two random variables, B†1(x
0), B†2(x
0) both taking value in {−A,A}, such that
P
(
lim
k→∞
xi(k) = B
†
1, i ∈ V1; lim
k→∞
xi(k) = B
†
2, i ∈ V2
∣∣∣Esep()) = 1 (81)
for all  > 0, where by definition, Esep() is the -separation event:
Esep() :=
{
lim sup
k→∞
max
i∈V1,j∈V2
∣∣xi(k)− xj(k)∣∣ ≥ }.
Proof. Suppose xi1(0) − xi2(0) ≥  > 0 for i1 ∈ V1 and i2 ∈ V2. By assumption, GV1 and GV2 are
connected. Thus, from Lemma 5, there exist an integer Z1 ≥ 1 and a constant p¯ (both depending on
, n, α, a, b) such that
min
i∈V1
xi(Z1)−max
i∈V2
xi(Z1) ≥ 
2
(82)
happens with probability at least p¯. Intuitively Eq. (82) characterizes the event where the beliefs in the
two sets V1 and V2 are completely separated. Since all edges between the two sets are negative, conditioned
on event (82), it is then straightforward to see that almost surely we have limk→∞ xi(k) = A, i ∈ V1 and
limk→∞ xi(k) = −A, i ∈ V2.
Given Esep(),
{∃i1 ∈ V1, i2 ∈ V2 s.t. xi1(k) − xi2(k) ≥  for infinitely many k} is an almost sure
event. Based on our previous discussion and by a simple stopping time argument, the Borel-Cantelli
Lemma implies that the complete separation event happens almost surely given Esep(). This completes
the proof. 
Lemma 9 Assume that the graph is strongly balanced under partition V = V1 ∪ V2, and that GV1 and
GV2 are connected. Suppose α ∈ (0, 1) \ {1/2}. Then under dynamics (19), there exists β sufficiently
large such that P
(Esep(A/2)) = 1 for almost all initial beliefs.
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Proof. Let us first focus on a fixed time instant k. Suppose xi(k)− xj(k) ≥ A for some i, j ∈ V. If i and
j belong to different sets V1 and V2, we already have maxi∈V1,j∈V2
∣∣xi(k) − xj(k)∣∣ ≥ A. Otherwise, say
i, j ∈ V1. There must be another node l ∈ V2. We have maxi∈V1,j∈V2
∣∣xi(k) − xj(k)∣∣ ≥ A/2 since either
|xi(k)− xl(k)| ≥ A/2 or |xj(k)− xl(k)| ≥ A/2 must hold. Therefore, we conclude that
X(k) ≥ A =⇒ max
i∈V1,j∈V2
∣∣xi(k)− xj(k)∣∣ ≥ A/2. (83)
Then the desired conclusion follows directly from Lemma 7. 
Theorem 4 is a direct consequence of Lemmas 8 and 9.
I. Proof of Theorem 5
The proof is similar to that of Theorem 4. We just provide the main arguments.
First by Lemma 7 we have P(lim supk→∞X(k) = 2A) = 1 for almost all initial values with sufficiently
large β. Then as for (83), we have
X(k) ≥ A =⇒ max
i∈Vs,j∈Vt,s 6=t∈{1,...,m}
∣∣xi(k)− xj(k)∣∣ ≥ A
m
, (84)
where m ≥ 2 comes from the definition of weak balance. Therefore, introducing
E∗sep() :=
{
lim sup
k→∞
max
i∈Vs,j∈Vt,s 6=t∈{1,...,m}
∣∣xi(k)− xj(k)∣∣ ≥ },
we can show that P
(E∗sep(A/m)) = 1 for almost all initial beliefs, for sufficiently large β.
Next, suppose there exist a constant η > 0 and two node sets Vi1 and Vi2 with i1, i2 ∈ {1, . . . ,m}
such that the complete separation event
min
i∈Vi1
xi(k)− max
i∈Vi2
xi(k) ≥ η (85)
happens. Recall that the underlying graph is complete. Then if (β + 1)η ≥ 2A, we can always select
Z∗ := |Vi1 |+ |Vi2 | negative edges between nodes in the sets Vi1 and Vi2 , so that after the corresponding
updates:
xi(k + Z∗) = A, i ∈ Vi1 , xi(k + Z∗) = −A, i ∈ Vi2 . (86)
One can easily see that we can continue to build the (finite) sequence of edges for updates, such that
nodes in Vk will hold the same belief in {−A,A}, for all k = 1, . . . ,m. After this sequence of updates, the
beliefs held at the various nodes remain unchanged (two nodes with the same belief cannot influence each
other, even in presence of a negative link; and two nodes with different beliefs are necessarily enemies).
To summarize, conditioned on the complete separation event (85), we can select a sequence of node pairs
under which belief clustering is reached, and this clustering state is an absorbing state.
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Finally, the Borel-Cantelli Lemma and P
(E∗sep(A/m)) = 1 guarantee that almost surely the complete
separation event (85) happens an infinite number of times if η = A/2m in view of Lemma 5. The end of
the proof is then done as in that of Theorem 4.
J. Proof of Theorem 6
Again the result is obtained by combining Lemmas 5 and 7 with Borel-Cantelli lemma.
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